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De Paisano a Paisano: Mexican Migrants and the Transference of Political 
Attitudes to their Country of Origin. 
Luis F. Jiménez, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2008 
 
Is there a link between immigration and democratization?  Can immigrants transfer 
democratic values to their countries of origin?  If so, what are the implications for the countries 
in question?  This dissertation looks into the theoretical construct of social remittances and tests 
it empirically using both quantitative and qualitative methods.  Quantitatively speaking, this gets 
tested using survey and aggregate data.  Qualitatively speaking, field work was carried out in a 
number of Mexican States.  This work found that migrants do play a role in local politics through 
the transference of political attitudes.  This includes, but is not limited to political participation, 
the incumbent party’s fortunes, the governor’s party’s coalition’s chances for reelection, the 
overall electoral competitiveness, and third party’s share of the vote.  This grassroots impact, 
however is tempered and constrained by the same dynamics that led individuals to migrate in the 
first place. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Is there a link between immigration and democratization?  Can immigrants transfer democratic 
values to their countries of origin?  If so, what are the implications for the countries in question? 
As human flows from the developing to the developed world continue to increase, the intricacies 
of immigrant assimilation have generated much debate among academics and the public at large.  
This discussion, in turn, has produced two competing intellectual camps.  
The first group has alarmist tones. Its members openly worry that the host countries no 
longer have the capability to assimilate the current waves of immigration, given both 
technological advances and the specific nature of the new flows in question, which they contend 
augurs disaster for both the host countries and the immigrants themselves (Huntington 2004, 
Wikan 2002). In particular, scholars in this camp argue that immigrants are bringing anti-
democratic, authoritarian, fundamentally alien ideas that go contrary to the political culture and 
tradition of the country and that ultimately might severely damage the democratic pillars of the 
host societies.  This harsh criticism has been directed at two groups in particular, Latinos in the 
United States and Muslims in Europe.  Thus, to summarize, the argument from this camp is that 
Muslims and Latinos are essentially different to the host countries’ citizenry, and despite a long 
presence, no assimilation has occurred and is not likely to be in the offing, which will ultimately 
lead to balkanization and hurt democracy.   
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The second group disputes these conclusions, uncovering a plethora of evidence showing 
that the behavior of the new flows is not so unlike previous immigrant waves, not to mention that 
immigrants are indeed assimilating. For example, they have found that immigrant minorities 
reflect attitudes on a host of issues similar to those of natives in the United States and Europe 
(Kelley and McAllister 1984, De la Garza, Falcón and García 1996, Dancygier and Saunders 
2006).  Likewise, research has shown that ethnic ties do not determine political attitudes (De la 
Garza and Yutim 2003), that partisanship and voting among immigrants do increase the longer 
immigrants stay in the United States (Bass and Casper 2001, Portes and Mozo 1985: 50, Wong 
2000), that they are not less likely to be politically active than native born respondents (Barreto 
and Muñoz 2003) , that education does increase participation among immigrants, but not always 
as one would expect (Doerschler 2004), and that they might even exceed natives in supporting 
and being satisfied with the host countries’ institutions (Bilodeau 2004).  In addition, the Pew 
Hispanic Center has uncovered additional data that demonstrates that Hispanics in the United 
States show a level of assimilation similar to previous immigrant waves.  For instance, they point 
out that first generation immigrants speak English fluently, are as likely to marry outside their 
ethnic group, and tend to have better jobs than their parents. 
Given a scenario where immigrants are assimilating and seeing a shift in their political 
attitudes, one is left with an intriguing proposition, namely the opposite of the argument 
proposed by the alarmist camp, that immigrants can lead to the transference of democratic and 
other positive norms to their countries of origin.1  In fact, some scholars have already looked into 
this phenomenon, terming it social remittances (Levitt 1999).  According to Levitt, social 
                                                 
1 This is not to imply that socialization only has positive consequences, or that all individuals would be socialized 
and react in the same way.  Depending on their residence, age, wealth and other socio-demographic factors, for 
example, individuals might be more likely to assimilate non-positive traits such as violence, ill-treatment of women 
and join gangs or other criminal networks as exemplified by the Mara Salvatrucha. 
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remittances are the ideas, behaviors, identities and social capital that flow from host to sending 
country communities (1999). While always theoretically possible, this phenomenon has only 
recently gained traction because of two interrelated phenomena, a larger number of migrants in 
all corners of the globe, and developments in travel and communication technology. This 
dissertation aims to build on this insight.  Specifically, this work will show how the immigration 
experience itself contributes to attitude change, how these ideas are transferred back to the 
countries of origin, how the transference of these ideas has already had an impact on the political 
behavior of individuals in Latin America, and more specifically how these new political outlooks 
have contributed to Mexican political life, particularly in political races at the local level. 
1.1 PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
The political aspects of Levitt’s conceptual framework have been almost completely unexplored.  
To this respect, previous literature can be divided into two distinct areas which contribute to the 
understanding of two interrelated aspects of this phenomenon.  In the first component, political 
science has long explored how and why interaction with other people and environments can 
shape political behavior.  In the second, anthropology and sociology have investigated how and 
why social networks across borders form, the ways in which they are different, and the impact 
they have at both ends of the connecting nodes.  The literature for each is explored in more detail 
below. 
Since the early transnational anthropological work of George Marcus (1989) which 
shifted the emphasis of ethnographies from place to places, there has been much work 
contextualizing transnational social networks.  In the past decade, the political aspects of 
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transnationalism have gathered particular salience.  Scholars have tried to theorize on the new 
deterrioralization dimensions of social movements and networks (Basch, et. al. 1994, Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, Khragam et. al. 2002, Tarrow 1998); on how these complex relationships are in 
effect creating a new form of citizenship that exists beyond inclusion within a single state 
(Goldring 2001, Soysal 1994, Fitzgerald 2000); and how migrants are actively shaping these 
networks independent of both the host country and country of origin (Castañeda 2006, Smith 
2003). Within the more empirical strand there has been work dealing with the politics of 
transnational voting rights and dual citizenship (Guarnizo 1998, Jones-Correa 2001, Martinez 
Saldaña 2003) and the extraterritorial extension of homeland political parties (Levitt 2001, Smith 
2003).  Levitt, for example, provides empirical evidence for her theoretical claims using the 
Dominican migrants in Boston and their impact on the politics of the island (2001).  Likewise, 
the politics of hometown organizations have become a much studied phenomenon recently 
(Goldring 1998, Østergaard-Nielsen  2003, Portes et. al. 2007) in addition to other forms of 
transnational political practices (Guarnizo et. al. 2003).  
The transnational literature has suggested a link between immigration and 
democratization.  For instance, Portes has pointed out that “translocal initiatives may not only 
benefit the home village or region but also challenge the political rule at the national level” 
(Portes 1999). Beyond that, scholars perceive a budding transnational civil society which has the 
potential to dramatically impact undemocratic top-down systems through grass roots 
organization bringing accountability and bottom-up political demands that might otherwise not 
exist in some places around the globe.  In this way, the debate delineating the potential role of 
immigrants as democratizing agents for the countries of origin exists but has been mostly carried 
out at the theoretical level within the transnational literature (Guarnizo 1998b, Laguerre 1999, 
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Levitt 2001, Moctezuma Longoria 2002).  The reasons for this are clearly methodological and 
revolve around the difficulty of measuring the possible impact migrants abroad have on their 
country of origin, whether on more common processes like elections or on the influence of 
transnational networks.     
Thus, while this literature suggests ways in which immigrants could act as the conduits of 
democratic values, no systematic work has looked specifically at this issue.  Levitt, for instance, 
provides anecdotal evidence based on interviews carried out in the island, but her emphasis is not 
on politics or specific political outcomes, and lacks any evidence beyond the Dominican 
Republic. Elsewhere, on matters of political impact the evidence is either scarce or not directly 
related to immigrants.  For example, scholars have documented the active political participation 
that Mexican immigrants have had upon return to their homeland (Bada 2004, Smith and Bakker 
2005, Velázquez 2004).  Specifically Bada (2004) reported that 37% of the 113 presidentes 
municipales (county executives) in Michoacán had been former migrants.  Other examples report 
on Dominican and Haitian political participation and how migrant groups in the United States 
have lobbied and gained their right to vote abroad along with some representation (Graham 
1997, Guarnizo 1998a).  Likewise, scholars interested in international relations have long 
recognized the importance of transnational networks as conduits of values (Khragram et. al. ed. 
2002, Park 2005), but none of these works have recognized the importance of migrant networks 
as important agents of socialization.  
Meanwhile, political science has long recognized the importance of friends and neighbors 
in providing cues and information to uninformed voters (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1991, Robinson 
1976).  It has also emphasized the importance of social networks in providing pressure and 
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encouragement to participate in politics (Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008, Huckfeldt and 
Sprague 1991, McClurg 2006, Nickerson 2008).   
Gerber et. al., for example, made a connection between social pressure and voting. Their 
experiment demonstrated that those who were primed to consider social pressure were far more 
likely to vote than those who were not primed. Likewise, a face-to-face canvassing experiment 
where individuals were either exposed to a Get out the Vote message or a recycling pitch used by 
Nickerson found that 60% of the propensity to vote from the person receiving the voting pitch 
passed onto the other member of the household. It should be pointed out that this literature has 
faced an inherent self-selection bias problem from the beginning, some more then others.  This 
revolves around the problem of untangling the extent to which the environment and networks 
contribute to the shifting of political attitudes and behavior.  In other words, we know that 
environment and social networks matter in political decisions, we just do not know precisely to 
what degree.  
   More closely related to this issue, scholars have investigated how being exposed 
to different political ideas impacts political behavior.  In particular, they have been interested 
with political disagreement.  Some scholars have concluded that exposure to political 
disagreement has some positive effects on tolerance (Mutz 2002), that it increases participation 
in heterogeneous contexts because of increased competition (Campbell 2004), or because of the 
importance of participatory norms (Oliver 2001).  Similarly, when considering the impact of 
political disagreement on campaign participation, McClurg found that the general context 
contributes to individuals’ political attitudes, but this is conditioned by their status in their 
neighborhood, specifically whether or not they were part of the majority (2004).  In this way, as 
models become more and more sophisticated, the literature has found ample evidence to suggest 
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that networks matter in the change and transference of political attitudes.  To my knowledge, 
however, this has not been applied anywhere to immigrant social networks.   
1.2 THE ARGUMENT 
The above review of the literature illustrates two distinct but interrelated phenomena: immigrants 
are assimilating new attitudes from their host countries, while simultaneously engaging in 
cultural and political activities across borders that provide the opportunity to transmit democratic 
norms to their countries of origin.  Are ideas actually being transferred, however? Before we can 
test this empirically, we need to develop a theoretical basis for two central questions in this 
matter.  First, how does the immigration experience lead to the transformation of political 
attitudes? Second, how do these new attitudes actually get transmitted to the countries of origin? 
1.2.1 The changing of attitudes 
The first manner in which this happens has already been introduced, namely experience 
in long-established democracies help shape political beliefs, socializing individuals towards 
having attitudes long sustained to have a positive impact on democracy.  Some evidence exists, 
for example, that after some time, Mexican immigrants living in the United States change their 
attitudes on a number of scores including trust of institutions, partisanship, among others (Camp 
2003). In addition, evidence exist showing that Mexicans transform their original views of 
democracy to match that of non-Hispanic citizens even after relatively short periods of time 
(Camp 1999). Likewise, we know that individuals’ support of democratic values, structures and 
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processes augments considerably once they perceive that a regime is delivering increased 
economic opportunities and democratic freedoms (Bratton and Mattes 1999, Evans and 
Whitefield 1995, Mishler and Rose 1997, Weil 1989). The immigrant population fits this exactly, 
as most of them come either because of economic or political reasons, and their perception of 
their host country promptly reflects this, regardless of how they might feel for their country of 
origin. 
Second, the perception of the other and self begins to shift at its most basic level.  For 
example, one is no longer paisa (someone from Medellín, Colombia), tapatío (someone from 
Guadalajara, Mexico), Salvadoran or Dominican, but Hispanic, Latino, foreigner or everywhere 
in between.  This possible transformation in national and ethnic identification, can also lead to a 
renewed interest in politics, sometimes transforming the place immigrants see for themselves in 
the larger society to the point of altering their societal demands.  For instance, there has been 
some work that shows that the longer immigrants stay in the United States the more likely they 
are to perceive discrimination (Portes, Parker and Cobas 1980).  Within the transnational 
literature, there has also been evidence that in so-called exclusive political systems like 
Germany’s, where migrants have difficulty shedding their label as foreigners, migrants develop 
more transnational claim making than in similar European countries (Koopman and Statham 
2001). Others have looked at how this identity negotiation develops and at its subsequent 
political manifestations (Castañeda 2006).     
Third, political socialization has long argued that life events have the greatest impact to 
shape people’s attitudes when they occur in adolescence and young adulthood (Schumann and 
Corning 2000, Schumann and Scott 1989), precisely the age at which most individuals migrate to 
the United States and Europe.  Related to this is what we know about knowledge, namely that it 
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not only can have the power to alter attitudes but also behavior (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).  
At the most basic level, this is what is happening with immigrants, particularly the 
underprivileged and uneducated who might not know much about the country they are 
immigrating to.  Immigration is a particularly compelling lesson in politics because by definition 
the transformation occurs in going from one polity to another and therefore, immigrants find out 
not only about international policy regarding human flows, but also differences in political 
structures, debate, issues, and at the most basic level changes in the basic services that the state 
provides—something particularly noticeable if the host country operates more efficiently than 
the country of origin.  This can occur even with limited interaction with the government of the 
host country, but also in everyday activities.  Consider, for example, Latin American immigrants 
watching the nightly news in the United States. While the news in their countries of origin might 
have taken some interest in world events, it is safe to assume that they concentrate for the most 
part on national and regional issues.  Not so with the Spanish news in the United States.  Given 
their audience, the Spanish news TV networks have an extensive coverage of Latin America 
bringing into immigrant living rooms all kinds of political events that they would likely not have 
come across before. 
Fourth, in recent decades political scientists have recognized the importance of contextual 
influences on participation, vote choice, candidate evaluation, attitude formation, among others 
(Huckfeldt 1986, Wald, Owen and Hill 1988), particularly in the way that personal friendships 
and social networks can shape the attitude formation of individuals (Eulau and Rothenberg 1986, 
Gimpel, Dyck and Shaw 2004, McCloskey and Dalhgren 1959, MacKuen and Brown 1987).  
Again, immigrant communities in the host nation provide a suitable context both to politicize the 
individual and to transmit political values.  This is because in a hostile cultural environment, 
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immigrants tend to cluster to preserve their identity.  This, in turn, brings individuals into 
relatively intimate contact, which might otherwise never have happened in their country of origin 
given class and other social differences.  In this way, as immigration expands social networks to 
include individuals whose raison d’etre for being abroad might contradict another immigrants’ 
assumptions about his or her country, perceptions about both their home country and the political 
processes there might change.    
Finally, the political behavior literature has shown high levels of social trust to be a major 
predictor in support for democracy (Putnam 1993, 1995, Brehm and Rahn 1997).  While it could 
be said that immigrants already possess high interpersonal trust given the associated risks in 
moving to another country and the need for an extended social network, it has also been argued 
that the immigration experience itself increases social trust, because immigrants have a higher 
need of social networks to operate successfully in their host country (Portes 1997, Massey et. al. 
1998).  To summarize then, the experience of immigration itself, transforms the political 
attitudes of immigrants through a number of social, economic and environmental factors, which 
in turn lead to them becoming potential conduits of values. 
Certainly, not all migrants will necessarily absorb all ideas in the same way; local 
context, agency, social networks, social class, education and the politics of the country of origin 
matter.  Levitt recognized this and developed three broad assimilationist patterns for migrants.  
These are recipient observers, instrumental adapters, and purposeful innovators (2001).  The first 
one are individuals that have little to no interaction with the host society and must passively 
come into contact with new ideas and political attitudes through other members of their migrant 
group, television, newspapers or radio.  Recipient observers are more likely to be men than 
women.  The second type—instrumental adaptors—are far more integrated into life in the host 
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society. Given the new challenges they face as they venture further into different points of the 
public space, they adapt skills and attitudes for pragmatic reasons.  As Levitt puts it: “they adjust 
the way they interpret the world to equip themselves better to meet the challenges and constraints 
of migrant life.” (2001: 57).  Finally, Levitt’s purposeful innovators are individuals who actively 
seek out new ideas, attitudes and experiences.  The key difference is that unlike instrumental 
adaptors, they alter their mindset not as a pragmatic concession, but as an enthusiastic embrace 
of all potential beneficial aspects of the host society.   For our present purposes, one would 
expect not just a wider repertoire of altered political attitudes from Levitt’s purposeful 
innovators, but also broader influence with those individuals who they remain in contact with 
back home.  Thus, hypothetically speaking, one could anticipate that attitude change would be 
most likely to occur when individuals migrated to small immigrant communities rather than long 
established immigrant enclaves, where interaction with the larger host community became a 
matter of necessity rather than choice.  Still, while one would expect local context and personal 
circumstances to matter, and while they might aggregate different depending on existing social 
networks in the host society, it is important to note that all migrants have the potential to a shift 
in attitude because they all face at the most fundamental level, no matter the particular host 
society or country of origin, a change in political practices and culture.  The matter is to trace the 
impact of these changed ideas once they occur. 
1.2.2 The channeling of attitudes 
While the instruments behind the transformation of immigrants’ political attitudes might 
seem rather straight forward, it is still necessary to elaborate on the link between this change 
with immigrants and their transformation into social remittances.  There are two basic reasons 
  11
  
behind the existence of this dynamic today.  First, immigrants as individuals have much more 
contact with their country of origin than even just a decade ago.  Technological advances in 
communications have made it possible for those living abroad to maintain relatively close 
contact with those left behind. Not only have international telephone rates been dramatically 
reduced, but e-mail, instant messaging and other web interactions have virtually eliminated 
communication barriers across borders.  Simultaneously, a whole service industry has developed 
around the sending and receiving of remittances, increasing dramatically their economic leverage 
and thickening the relationship between those abroad and those left behind along the way.   
This latter point is particularly important because we know from the political behavior 
literature that simple contact with ideas or beliefs is not enough to change anyone’s mind.  Other 
factors play a role, particularly whether the source happens to be someone who is trustworthy 
(Zaller 1992). Immigrants who send remittances home fit this role rather well. This is because 
they are both more likely to have regular communication with their communities of origin and 
more likely to enjoy the admiration of their countrymen, given their success abroad, and their 
willingness to share that with those left behind.  In fact, I see remittances as a proxy for social 
networks. Evidence for one side of this link exists as we do know that Mexicans who stay in 
contact with their relatives in Mexico are more likely to be politically active in the United States 
(Garcia 1987: 386).  We also know that “if someone has a weak inclination to vote, the presence 
of another family member who has some tendency in the same direction will raise the probability 
that both will vote.” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980: 45).   
Second, institutions mediating the relationship between immigrants and their country of 
origin have also multiplied, both at the grassroots level and from the perspective of the state.  For 
example, hometown organizations have proliferated all across Mexico, both because of the 
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interest of Mexicans in the United States to help their local community and a state program that 
matches funds sent from abroad.  Similar institutional initiatives have been put into place in India 
and Turkey.  Elsewhere, Central American countries have also become interested in developing 
this relationship with organizations that have developed organically in the United States.  
Another case in point is the policy states have pursued in trying to maintain a relationship 
with its citizens abroad encouraging them to return, and granting voting rights to those living 
outside of the country in a number of cases as different as Ecuador, Eritrea, Vietnam and 
Romania.  For example, in the case of Vietnam, the government has actively tried to bring back 
those citizens that left the country due to the turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s.  It has met with 
some success and the top communist leadership has insisted that their present success would 
have been impossible without those “patriotic” migrants (Economist, 2008).  Meanwhile, the 
Ecuadorian government has expanded voting rights to its citizens abroad, courted them as voting 
block, encouraged them to invest in their country, and instituted laws to facilitate property 
acquisition for those outside the country.  This shift in policy has given migrants a collective 
voice that routinely finds room in their country of origin.  For instance, it is not rare to read 
migrants opinions on the issues of the day in Ecuadorian or Mexican newspapers.  This is 
significant not only in the sense of augmenting the possible points of influence for migrants, but 
also in that institutional growth channeling migrants opinions has awarded them greater 
legitimacy, paving the way for immigrants to act as a possible conduit of values. 
In this way, this dissertation argues that the immigration experience itself leads 
immigrants to modify their political attitudes due to two distinct but related processes, namely 
politicization as a result of going from one country to another (particularly one regime to 
another), and political socialization as immigrants come in contact with political values different 
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from the ones in their country of origin.  Given this change in political attitudes, one should 
expect some type of political outcome.  I argue that immigrants serve as conduits of values, 
which have distinct political impact in their countries of origin.  This occurs most visibly through 
elections, but is not only limited to that.  Furthermore, I argue that while ex-patriots, dissidents 
and exile politics have a long history in affecting political outcomes at home, the phenomenon I 
describe is distinct from these earlier dynamics given both the raw number of immigrants, their 
ability to maintain contact with their countries of origin, as well as the new found importance of 
remittances in the countries’ economies.    Hence, the causal argument can be summarized in this 
way: Individuals migrate.  The host society and the migration experience itself provides the 
opportunity for migrants to shift their political attitudes with migrants falling into various broad 
patterns of assimiliation.  This, in turn, leads to a behavior change and the transference of these 
attitudes to their country of origin, which should have some impact on political outcomes like 
elections and political participation. 
To show evidence in each instance, the dissertation is divided into four chapters, three 
empirical and a conclusion.  The second chapter looks at the impact that migrants have on 
political attitudes at the individual level using survey data both from individuals in the U.S. and 
those who have returned to their country of origin.  The third chapter looks at the impact that 
migrants have on political outcomes in the aggregate.  Using data collected in Mexican 
municipios, I explore the impact of migrants on participation, electoral competitiveness, and 
party incumbency.  The fourth chapter, reports the fieldwork carried out in Mexican municipios 
in the summer of 2007.  The effort combined interviews of political elites and regular individuals 
in areas with heavy migration to the United States.  The final chapter concludes.  
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2.0  IMPACT OF MIGRANTS AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 
Is there a link between immigration and democratization?  Can immigrants transfer democratic 
values to their countries of origin? If so, what impact does this have on the political behavior of 
the countries of origin? More generally, what broader implications does this have for the 
migrant-sending regions? The literature has suggested that social remittances might, in fact, be 
another phenomenon attributable to migrants, but no one has tested this possibility because of the 
general lack of data.  The previous chapter has outlined in detail the theoretical underpinnings 
exploring these questions.  In particular, the argument delineating why and how migrants can act 
as conduits of political values has been set forth.   
This contention can be summarized as follows.  First, the immigration experience can 
lead to a fundamental shift in the perception about place and an individual’s relationship to it.  
Before migration, the point of reference for most migrants tends to be either class related or 
regional, but after migration, nationality becomes the main point of reference, sometimes the 
exclusive one.  In dealing with other migrants, with people from the host country in general, or 
with institutions, an individual’s identity becomes intertwined with that individual’s nationality.  
This first leads to a fundamental rethinking of the individual’s own country, particularly for 
those living in relatively isolated areas, and eventually to increased politicization as migrants 
begin to make the connection between political outcomes and policies.   
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Second, immigration foments the interaction of migrants of different social backgrounds 
and potentially even languages.  Oftentimes, migrants come into contact with individuals who 
share their nationality but little else, and thus, it is yet another instance in which the knowledge 
of their country of origin begins to change.  More fundamentally, this interaction allows migrants 
to come into contact with political ideas and positions different from their own (Hoskin 1989). 
Simultaneously, the immigration experience increases the potential to shift political 
attitudes.  The reason is clear.  While mere exposure to new ideas is usually not enough to 
change anyone’s behavior, a migrant’s identity dilutes individuals’ natural propensity to ignore 
or reject ideas.  This stems from the fact that migrants tend to be younger and depend heavily on 
social networks to operate in the host country, thus, trust is high within this arrangement and 
fertile ground for potential assimilation of new political ideas.  For example, consider two 
individuals of different social classes from the same Central American country at opposite ends 
of the Civil War divide of the 1980s.  Despite having dramatically opposite political opinions 
about their country, the immigration experience could elicit their commonalities related to 
everyday life in the U.S., given their shared nationality and social concerns as an ethnic 
community in a foreign country.  This generates an environment where attitudes related to the 
Civil War might shift, or at the very least soften, in relation to each other.    
Fourth, the immigration experience itself, at its most basic form, is a shift in the political 
order, which implies change in the most fundamental aspects of an individual’s relationship to 
the government. Given this, the immigration experience is a constant comparison—at times quite 
unconscious—between two distinct set of political institutions, with the result that individuals 
can become more critical of the institutions of the country of origin, or at the very least, begin to 
recognize their shortcomings. This is not to say that migrants immediately embrace their host 
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country and want to recreate it in their country of origin, as soon as possible, but merely that 
migrants begin a gradual shift in political attitudes, which has an impact on their political 
behavior and political outcomes in their native countries.  Given this change in political attitudes, 
one should expect some type of political outcome.  I argue that immigrants serve as conduits of 
values, which have distinct political impact in their countries of origin.  This occurs most visibly 
through elections, but is not only limited to that.  Furthermore, I argue that while ex-patriots, 
dissidents and exile politics have a long history in affecting political outcomes at home, the 
phenomenon I describe is distinct from these earlier dynamics given both the raw number of 
immigrants, their ability to maintain contact with their countries of origin, as well as the new 
found importance of remittances in the countries’ economies.     
Again, our theory suggests that social networks shape and transfer political attitudes at 
both ends of the social link.  This leads to interesting manifestations that can be corroborated 
empirically and that lend us the hypotheses to be tested in this chapter.  First, we can theorize 
about immigrants living in the United States.  As mentioned before, one can expect that migrants 
in the United States are more critical of their country’s institutions.  We might also anticipate 
that migrants in the U.S. hold different partisan preferences than those that remained in Mexico.  
Thus, our first two hypotheses are: 
H1  Dissatisfaction with Mexican institutions should be higher the longer one lives in 
the United States. 
 
H2  Partisanship identification should be different the longer one lives in the United 
States. 
Next, we can hypothesize about those individuals who have returned or who have a link  
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 abroad through the receipt of remittances.  Thus, we might predict the following: 
 
H3  Participation in political affairs will be higher both for those individuals who 
have lived in the United States and for those who receive remittances. 
 
H4  Political efficacy will be higher both for those individuals who have lived in the 
United States and for those who receive remittances. 
 
H5  Attitudes against political corruption will be higher both for those individuals 
who have lived in the United States and for those who receive remittances. 
 
In this way, this chapter will analyze the potential change in the political behavior of 
individuals.  It will analyze the impact that having lived in the United States or received 
remittances has on one’s level of political participation, political efficacy, and attitudes about 
corruption.  It will do so, first, by taking into account the attitudes of immigrants living in the 
United States. 
 
 
2.1 THE ARGUMENT 
To test whether individuals’ attitudes in the country of origin are actually changing as a result of 
influence from migrants, I used two surveys, the Pew Hispanic Center Survey of Mexicans 
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Living in the U.S. and the Latin American Public Opinion Project.  Given the potential criticisms 
of self-selection bias, I utilized the first survey to demonstrate how migrants still living in the 
United States have different views about partisanship and institutions in Mexico than those 
remaining in the country; thus, proving that only the migration experience can explain the 
potential attitude change.  Similarly, the second survey will display the extent to which, having 
lived in the United States mattered for attitude change among return migrants.  
The first survey collected the responses of Mexican migrants in a number of sites in the 
United States during the span of several months between 2004 and 2005.  It should be noted that 
the survey was not a representative sample of migrants in the United States.  This is largely due 
to the difficulties in delineating the target population and in reaching out to these individuals 
given their migration status.  Rather, the survey was a purposive sample that interviewed 
Mexican migrants as they visited the Mexican consulate.  The sample contained 900 cases from a 
wide variety of locations in the U.S. These comprised the major areas of Mexican presence in the 
country (Chicago, L.A., Dallas) in addition to some smaller and newer immigrant communities 
(Raleigh and Atlanta), and places where migrants lived almost exclusively off of agricultural 
jobs (Fresno).  Overall, the sample had a larger educational attainment than the migrant 
population at large, but does resemble the migrant population in terms of age and gender.  While 
this sample does not represent the ideal characteristics one would hope for in a survey, at the 
moment no sample can avoid these issues because we simply lack accuracy in some basic 
characteristics of the target population including size, and location. 
The dependent questions of interest revolved around two topics: institutions and 
partisanship.  The first inquired about institutional efficiency and asked individuals to rank how 
well Mexican institutions functioned.  The second asked about closeness to the three major 
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Mexican parties: Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and 
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD).  Specifically, the dependent questions asked: “In 
general, what is your opinion of how Mexican institutions work?  Would you say that they are 
very good, good, fair, bad, very bad?” And, “In Mexican politics, which of the political parties, 
do you feel closest to: the PRI, the PAN, the PRD, or do you not feel close to any of the parties?”   
On the other hand, the independent variables incorporated into the statistical models had 
a rich variance in capturing a number of important aspects of life in the United States for 
Mexican citizens.  These comprised whether one had American citizenship, how long one had 
lived in the United States, whether one traveled to the country, the level of attention paid to 
Mexican affairs, and the extent to which one kept in touch with family in Mexico.  Likewise, the 
survey contained an additional variable—commonly used in the literature as a measure of social 
capital and a predictor of political participation—whether one belonged to any kind of civic 
organization in the United States. 
The second survey included data for a number of Latin American countries: Mexico, 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Colombia. These countries were chosen both 
because they happen to be the countries with the highest percentage of migrants abroad, and 
because all of them now allow their citizens to vote abroad, and retain their citizenship should 
they acquire a new one (Escobar 2007). The survey questions, especially designed to be 
comparative, were uniform across the region with questions of particular interest added to some 
countries.  The project, headed by Mitchell Seligson, was meant to be nationally representative 
of the voting age population and was carried out so as to obtain a stratified and clustered sample.  
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In general, the interviews were carried out among roughly between 1,500 individuals per 
country, although it varied slightly from country to country.2   
The survey contained the standard questions on political culture exploring inter-personal 
trust, trust in institutions, political tolerance, support for democracy, in addition to more specific 
questions on perceptions of corruption and delinquency.  I used these questions to create additive 
indexes that serve as the dependent variables for most of the statistical models below.  For 
democratic attitudes, for instance, I summed a number of questions relating to one’s tolerance for 
free speech and free assembly of those with anti-democratic views.  The higher the score, the 
more one strongly supported the right of these people to enjoy free speech and assembly. As far 
as the dependent variables, as already mentioned, both surveys contained the standard questions 
relating to political behavior, including trust in institutions, conceptualization of democracy, 
tolerance for others’ political activities, regime support, political participation in a number of 
guises—whether violent or non-violent, and whether anti-systemic or not.  In addition, the 
surveys asked questions alluding to inter-personal trust, church attendance and other forms of 
social capital, all of which have been shown to be important in predicting political participation 
(Putnam 1993, Brehm and Rahn 1997).   
More important for this chapter, however, is a battery of questions dealing directly with 
immigration and the connection to people living abroad.  Specifically, the independent variables 
of interest come from two questions.  These are: “Have you lived in the United States in the last 
three years?” And “Does your family receive remittances?” These will provide the independent 
variables of interest.  A number of additional independent variables are also available within the 
survey.  Among these we find partisanship and interest in politics measures, both of which have 
                                                 
2 For more specific information on the nature of the project see Seligson, 2004. 
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been proven to have an impact on political participation (Verba and Nie 1972).  I further utilized 
questions long understood to contribute to participation, such as sociotropic voting.  Finally, I 
included a number of standard control variables pertaining to individuals.  These include gender, 
age, education, income, religion, marital status and two variables—constructed as additive 
indexes—that aimed to capture individuals knowledge and how informed of current events they 
were.  It should also be noted that I used OLS with robust standard errors in addition to logit 
models where appropriate. 
2.2 DISCUSSION 
In looking at a hypothetical change as a result of immigrant influence, I explored a number of 
possible attitude changes in the country of origin.  As I mentioned at the outset, I was 
particularly interested in the impact on individuals’ participation and democratic attitudes. 
Before I can explore these issues, however, there are a number of issues to address.  The first one 
is to describe to the reader the individuals on which this narrative centers.  To do this, I have 
provided for the reader a first table that describes some important demographic aspects of the 
sample from the Latin American Public Project which we will be working with. This table 
illustrates a number of things.  First, the individuals in question tend to be younger when 
receiving remittances, but the age is more widespread regarding those who have lived in the 
United States in the previous three years.  In fact, in this sample, over a quarter of those who 
lived in the US in the past three years were over 50. Second, individuals tend to be poorer, 
particularly when receiving remittances.  More than half the sample of those who receive 
remittances enjoy roughly a mere $350 dollars or less a month.  It should be emphasized that the 
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survey question specifically asked the respondent to include any income coming from 
remittances, so that the actual income in their own country could be much smaller.  Those who 
have lived in the US in the past three years are somewhat richer—presumably as a result of their 
migration experience—but they still make up a disproportionate amount of less privileged 
individuals.  Third, individuals who receive remittances are more likely to be female, married 
and uneducated.  On the other hand, those who have lived in the US in the past three years are 
likely to be male, have slightly more education, but just as likely to be married.  Finally, both are 
more likely to be catholic, but far more so if they have lived in the US in the past three years.  
Table 1 is reported below. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Variables on Who Obtains Remittances 
Variable     Remittances   USA 
% of Sample     11%    2.3% 
% Age (16-20)       31.9%    16.0%   
% Age (20-35)        24.1%    29.1% 
% Age (35-50)        20.6%    27.8% 
% Age (50-92)        23.2%    27.0% 
% with income less than $320 a month 58.4%    48.6% 
% with income $321-540 monthly   22.7%    27.0%   
% with income more than $540  18.9%    24.3% 
% with six years of education or less  40.8%    34.6% 
Female       50.7%    41.8%  
Married (and common law)    52.8%    58.2%    
Catholic       63.2%    70.5% 
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Another important issue that requires attention is the self-selection bias possibility. It 
could be, after all, that individuals who migrate have higher inter-personal trust, tolerance for 
others, or some other attitude related to participation and support of democracy, and thus, any 
statistical results we might find in this direction might only be a reflection of these values, 
independent completely of the immigration experience.  In order to dispel this, I first ran a 
regression to understand the reasons why individual leave for another country.  Also, in all 
subsequent regressions, I included this variable to show the reader that the results are upheld 
even when controlling for an individuals’ potential decision to leave.  Table 2 uses an OLS 
model that regresses whether an individual plans to leave the country to work in the next for 
years on a number of probable explanations including a score for democratic attitudes.  The 
latter, it should be mentioned, is an additive index that combines several questions the reader 
may find in appendix A, along with other important variables used throughout the chapter. 
The most important result here is that, as can be observed, individuals planning on 
leaving the country are no more democratic than those who would stay behind.  Neither are they 
more likely to have other predictive values associated with democracy such as community 
participation.  Instead, the regression paints a profile, familiar to anyone who studies 
immigration, namely those considering leaving their country tend to be young, male, and 
uneducated, and who might have been abroad themselves or at least have contact with those 
abroad as the positive correlation with those who receive remittances and the dependent variable 
indicates. 
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Table 2. Democratic Attitudes and the Decision to Migrate 
 
 
 
Variable             Coefficient S. E.      
  
Receives Remittances   .849***  (.073)    
Lived in the USA    1.11***   (.159)  
Democratic Attitudes    -.001   (.002)        
Knowledgeable    -.084***   (.029)      
Informed     .055***   (.014)    
Comm. Participation    .007    (.009) 
Age      -.042***   (001)     
Female      -.573***   (.056)    
Education     .036***   (.008)     
Catholic     -.277*** (.057)        
Income     -.021  (.014)          
Unemployed     -.039  (.027)        
Constant      3.49***  (.197)   
     
Number of Observations     9855    
    
Dependent Variable: Decision to Migrate in the Next Three Years. 
All Prob>F  0.000 
Pseudo R2: 0992 
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10  
 
 
Still, the reader might remain skeptical.  A point of contention could be that of potential 
endogeneity since these surveys are not panel data and cannot be tested at different points in 
time.  In other words, perhaps the people being asked now about leaving might not be very 
democratic, but earlier ones were, the very ones unavailable in the survey.  While a valid point, 
theoretical and empirical considerations about these particular waves of immigration would 
make this rather unlikely.  For example, we know that other than having more female migrants, 
the reasons and make up of Mexican migration has changed little since the second wave of 
immigration to the United States in the 1940s (Massey 2002).  We also know that the main thrust 
of Central American and even Colombian immigration came through as a result of political 
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violence in the 1980s and 1990s respectively.  That is, we have plenty of evidence that 
individuals migrated because of more immediate considerations like violence and economic 
opportunity rather than a desire to move where there was more tolerance for individual rights.  
This has long been captured in the literature, and in fact, democratic attitudes are hardly, if ever, 
considered as a push/pull factor in the immigration literature (Jenkins 1977, Clark and Smith 
1996, Portes 1997, Massey 2002).  I also considered this question during my field research in 
Mexico, and found no evidence that democratic attitudes are, in fact, what cause people to 
migrate.  This will be discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
To further corroborate this, I used the Pew Hispanic Center Survey of Hispanics Living 
in the U.S.  That is, I looked at immigrants already living abroad. Here, the first question was 
whether or not there were any attitude changes with those living in the U.S. relative to those who 
never left.  This is what the table 3 captures in various models. 
The first thing to notice is that controlling for age, income, gender, and education, the 
longer one lives in the United States, the more likely that person is to be dissatisfied with 
Mexican institutions.  A similar result occurs for individuals who send money to Mexico, 
precisely the ones at the other side of the remittance link.  Not surprisingly, having U.S. 
citizenship also leads one to increased dissatisfaction, interestingly even when controlling for 
visits to the country. 
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Table 3. Attitudes about Mexican Institutions From Mexicans Living in the U.S., OLS Model 
 
 
 
Variable   Coefficient/S.E.          Coefficient/S.E.        Coefficient/S.E.  
     (1)   (2)       (3)  
  
Years lived in the US     -.007*   (.003)     
US Citizenship     -.289***  (.085) -.286***  (.085) 
Sent Money to Mexico -.170*    (.079)    -.178*     (.078)    -.195*    (.078)  
Phone Contact Frequency .002       (.027) -.008       (.025)  -.003     (.026) 
Travel to Mexico  .273**     (.077) .284**     (.075)  .276**     (.076) 
Membership in Civic   -.006    (.048)    -.003    (.048) -.048      (.059) 
Organization    
Level of Attention to            .104***    (.041) 
Mexican Affairs  
Female     -.039     (.072)   -.047      (.072)    -.061     (.072)  
Income   .002       (.001)    -.002      (.001)  .002*      (.001) 
Education   -.086**   (.000)  -.081**     (.000) .092**     (.000)  
Age     .004      (.004)   .003        (.003) .003       (.004) 
Constant   2.86**     2.88**     2.66**    
R2    0.039   0.046   0.058 
Adjusted R2   0.029   0.036   0.048 
Number of Observations  868   875   866   
   
Dependent Variable: The Functioning of Mexican Institutions 
Prob F= 0.0000 
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p <.10  
 
 
 
This table, therefore, provides some evidence that living in the United States has an 
independent effect on how one views one’s institutions of origin.  Certainly, the reader might 
note that simple dissatisfaction with an institution does not guarantee any particular response, 
particularly related to the transference of those values.  This does, however, make it more likely 
that they will, and it is only the first part of the puzzle.  The third table also notes some impact on 
partisanship.  What I did here was run individual logit models using partisan preferences which I 
first converted to dummy variables, so that each of the models uses one’s closeness to the 
particular party as the dependent variable. 
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Table 4. Closeness to a Particular Party from Mexicans Living in the US, Logit Model 
 
 
Variable              PRI     PRD     PAN   
  
Years lived in the US              -.019*  (.003)   -.020   (.014)   .005     (.007) 
Sent Money to Anyone in Mexico         -.302    (.190) -.053   (.256)  -.146     (.169) 
Frequency of Phone Contact          .002     (.027)  -.004  (.097)    -.057    (.061)   
Travel to Mexico           -.104  (.190)   -.199   (.261)    .601**   (.161)    
Membership in Civic Organization          -.077 (.165)   -.040  (.365)    -.078    (.250) 
Level of Attention to Mexican Affairs        .168     (.101)  .418**(.152)  .288*** (.091)  
Female               .026    (.177)   .547   (.236)  -.044    (.155)  
Income            -.002   (.002)    -.003   (.003)   -.002    (.002)   
Education            -.033   (.072) -.076   (.257)     .002    (.157) 
Age              .006    (.008)    .009   (.128)     .015    (.078)  
Constant            -1.40**                3.41**     -2.08** 
Pseudo R2             0.015   0.032    0.040 
Number of Observations            958    924    866   
   
Dependent Variable: Closeness to the PRI, PAN, PRD 
Prob F= 0.0000 
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p <.10  
 
 
 
The result that stands out immediately is the fact that Mexicans living abroad are no more 
likely to feel close to any of the particular parties the longer they live in the U.S., but do, in fact, 
have far less partisanship in favor of the PRI.  However weak the actual significance, this is an 
important result given that this survey was taken in 2004, that only about 3% of the sample had 
been in the US for less than two years, and the average length of time for the individuals in the 
sample was 16 years, the model illustrates that Mexicans abroad were far less partisan for the 
PRI than one would expect the general population in Mexico to be.  Moreover, the reader might 
also consider that the other two variables of significance, paying attention to Mexican affairs or 
traveling to Mexico prove significant for partisanship to the PAN and the PRD, but not the PRI. 
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That is, any of the individuals who actually pay attention to their home country politics was more 
likely to prefer the traditional opposition parties. 
To summarize our results so far: we have found evidence that migrants do not leave their 
country for political reasons and do not hold more democratic attitudes than the general 
population at large.  Likewise, we have discovered that Mexicans living abroad are more likely 
to be dissatisfied with institutions in their home country, feel less partisan devotion for the PRI, 
but do not replace it with allegiance to other parties, a clear example of political attitude change.  
If this attitude is transferred, it should be noticeable in the survey for those individuals who are 
living in Mexico and not abroad.  This is the next table to be reported. 
Again, this table suggests that those who have lived abroad are far more likely to be 
dissatisfied with Mexican Institutions, but interestingly are also more likely to participate in their 
community either in trying to help to solve a problem in their neighborhood, or by attending 
meetings aimed at solving issues affecting the community.  In this way, the table illustrates an 
idea that seems to have been transferred. 
Table 5. Impact of Migration on Satisfaction with Mexican Institutions in Mexico (OLS Model) 
 
 
Variable                       Coefficient S. E.   
   
Receives Remittances     -.027   (.053)  
  Lived in the USA      -.133*   (.076) 
Thinking about leaving the country    .095*   (.057)  
 Knowledgeable       .004   (.021)    
Informed       -.003***  (.009)   
Horizontal Trust       .003   (.013)   
Institutional Trust       -.009**  (.001)   
Community Participation     .009***  (.007)   
Current government support     -.141**  (.024)    
Ideological spectrum      -.001***  (.001)    
Age         .001   (.001)     
Female        -.008   (.037)    
Education       .013**   (.006)     
Catholic       .001   (.019)     
Income        .001   (.009)     
Current Economic Situation of the Country   -.084***    (.023)    
Economic Forecast for the Country     -.022   (.034)     
Unemployed        .012   (.033)    
Registered to vote      -.033*         (.019)    
Constant         3.49***  (.197)      
Number of Observations     1222     
Dependent Variable: satisfaction with democracy in Mexico 
All Prob>F  0.000 
R2 .1467 
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10 
 
 
 
The next model to consider is one examining whether immigrants have any impact on 
political participation.  In this case, this variable is also an additive index, which included voting, 
along with other forms of participation like partaking in a political protest, among others.  Table 
6 is reported below below.  As one might expect, the standard variables associated with political 
participation are also significant in this model.  Being more informed, participating more in 
community matters, and having greater institutional trust are all predictors of whether one 
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actually participates more in politics or not.  Likewise, being older, better educated and self 
identifying on the left side of the spectrum also make it more likely that someone will partake in 
political activity.   
More to the point of this chapter are the bolded variables.  The first variable of 
significance is our measure for remittances. If an individual’s family has received remittances, 
the individual is more likely to participate in politics.  As I have already stated, remittances are 
used here as proxies for social networks.  In this way, given the numerous control variables in 
place—income, age, etc.—one can only conclude that people who receive remittances participate 
more because of the influences of individuals abroad.  Of course, it is undeniable that the impact 
is relatively low, but the reader might consider that given the limitations of the data, it is 
important that it came out significant.  This is because there are numerous characteristics that the 
survey used here did not ask and thus, our statistical method could not capture.  In particular, 
following Levitt’s theoretical model we do not know much about the other end of the spectrum, 
and the individuals sending these remittances.    
This also partly explains why the United States variable turns out to be negative.  The 
explanation stems from its composition and its faulty nature.  The question measures only 
whether someone has lived in the United States in the past three years, but does not differentiate 
the actual time these people spent abroad or whether they returned home that very week.  In 
addition, the dependent variable of political participation measures specific activities within a 
very limited time frame, hence making it possible that those living in the US were still absent 
and did not have as many and did not have as many opportunities to take part in political events 
as those that never left.  Nevertheless, I also included a model without the US variable to 
demonstrate to the reader that the significance does not wash out once this is taken out of the 
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model. Subsequently, I ran a table to explore whether or not our independent variables of interest 
mattered in shaping an individual’s democratic attitudes. As the reader can corroborate in 
Appendix B, the dependent variable in this case is an additive index, comprised of questions 
related to democratic tolerance.  In particular, the questions tap into a person’s attitudes toward 
free speech and the rights of individuals with anti-governmental views, which were in turn 
scored the highest the more that person supported those rights. 
 
Table 6. Impact of Migrants on Political Participation 
 
Variable             Model 1   Model 2 
  
Receives Remittances   .213*** (.081)  .195***  (.074) 
Lived in the USA    -.309**  (.151) 
Thinking about leaving the country  -.067**  (.028) -.055**   (.025) 
Knowledgeable    -.006   (.025)   -.020       (.024) 
Informed     .101*** (.011) .099***   (.011) 
Horizontal Trust    -.021   (.019)   -.020       (.017) 
Institutional Trust     .007**  (.001)  .006***  (.001) 
Comm. Participation    .113*** (.008) .121***   (.007) 
Current gov. support    -.057**  (.027)  -.034       (.026) 
Ideological spectrum    -.002*** (.001)  -.003*** (.001) 
Age      .012***  (.002)   .011*** (.002) 
Female     -.279*** (.047) -.290***  (.044) 
Education     .054***  (.007) .050***   (.006) 
Catholic     .067    (.052)   .092*     (.024) 
Income     -.041*** (.011)  -.037*** (.011)  
Current Economic Situation of the Country  .011       (.028)   -.022      (.026) 
Economic Forecast for the Country  .086***   (.034) .098***   (.031) 
Unemployment    .016     (.020) .014          (.019) 
Registered to vote    -.210*** (.037)           -.284***   (.038)  
Constant      .715***   (.224)  .858***     (.210) 
Number of Observations   7437   8405 
R2      .0931   .0995 
     
Dependent Variable: political participation (see additive index) 
All Prob>F  0.000 
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10  
  
 
Thus, the regression demonstrates, not surprisingly, that the less an individual trusts the 
government and the more that individual participated in their community, the more likely it was 
for that individual to have higher democratic values.  Neither of the important variables appear 
significant, however.  It becomes necessary to take into account some of Levitt’s ideas about the 
individuals receiving remittances.  As she puts it, a person would be more likely to accept and 
adapt a social remittance if that person has more access to resources.  One way to do this is for 
add an interaction to the model.  Once we do that, we find out that the conditional coefficient 
when receiving remittances is 1.3 with a significance of 0.07.  This again means that those with 
connections to individuals abroad are more likely to be anti-authoritarian and actively support 
tolerance for those with opposite views to current government policy. No doubt the reader 
noticed that the other important variable, however, did not prove significant.  In fact, one might 
ask if migrants truly are the motors behind democratic tolerance, how could it be that they do not 
also show up as significant in the model?  While also a valid point, I would argue that this stems 
again from the nature of the question that it is based on.  The query in the survey, in fact, does 
not differentiate the reasons why individuals left, or make a distinction between those who spent 
weeks and those who spent years.  Clearly, it is not my intention to argue that merely showing up 
in a foreign country for a few weeks is enough to shift one’s political attitudes about democratic 
governance Actually, even if we could be sure that every single individual who answered in the 
affirmative to that question had spent exactly three years abroad, one could doubt a priori that 
this would be enough time to change something as essential as democratic attitudes.  The 
differences between our two variables of interest in the models, however, give us further clues 
into how this process actually develops.  I will develop this further in the conclusion.   
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Table 7. Impact of Migrants on Democratic Attitudes 
 
 
Variable             Model 1    Model 2  
 
Receives Remittances   .207       (.419)  1.62*     (.885) 
Lived in the USA    -1.20      (.943)  -1.20        (.940) 
Thinking about leaving Mexico   -.077      (.149) -.077       (.149) 
Knowledgeable    1.09*** (.139)  1.09***  (.139) 
Informed     .193***  (.064) .192***    (.064) 
Horizontal Trust    .133    (.100) .131         (.100) 
Institutional Trust    .090***  (.009)  .090***   (.009) 
Comm. Participation    -.108*** (.040) -.108***  (.040) 
Ideological spectrum    -.019*** (.004)  -.019***  (.004)  
Age      -.020**   (.009)  -.020**    (.009)  
Female     -.197    (.263) -.206         (.263) 
Education     .335***  (.038)   .333***   (.038) 
Catholic     .209        (.302)   .207        (.302) 
Income      .438*** (.063)    .475***  (.067)  
Current Economic Situation of the Country  -.229      (.156)   -.235        (.156) 
Economic Forecast for the Country  .227         (.182) .228         (.182)  
Unemployment    -.324*** (.117)  -.319*** (.117) 
Registered to vote    .018         (.220)  -.010        (.221) 
Wealth X Remittances      -.315*      (.170) 
Constant      19.7***  (1.25)    19.7***   (1.25) 
Number of Observations   7428   7428 
R2      .1072   .1075 
     
Dependent Variable: political participation (see additive index) 
All Prob>F  0.000 
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10 
 
 
Still, before we do that, consider the last table. The following table portrays a comparable 
phenomenon; it analyzes whether there was any influence on attitudes about corruption.  In 
general, corruption remains a pervasive problem in Latin America, and is one of the issues that 
the public routinely complains about.  Then again, it has been argued that corruption in the 
region is perceived as the cost associated with doing business or getting the wheels of 
government moving and hence, individuals living there have a higher threshold of tolerance for 
  34
  
it.  Therefore, if the immigration experience should have any impact, this is one of the areas that 
should be the most obvious, both given the stark difference between the nodes on each end of the 
international link, and the fact that immigrants are more likely to notice it.  Again, I created an 
additive index, where the higher a person scored on the metric the more intolerant that person 
would be of corrupt practices, served as the dependent variable.  Although I wanted to use data 
from all the countries of this model, the surveys for the various countries differed in this metric.  
Only in three countries were specific scenarios for corruption given, where the public was 
subsequently asked whether they found the act corrupt or not.  Given the focus of chapter three, I 
decided to use the questions solely for Mexico, and ran a model testing whether receiving 
remittances or living in the United States foments intolerance of corrupt acts among those 
individuals.  The questions employed in the creation of the model gave a number of scenarios 
where politicians used their office for their own or their family advantage.  People answering the 
survey then had to select from three different choices that defined the act as corrupt or not, with a 
middle ground that suggested the action was corrupt, but that it should not be punished.  
The model corroborated our intuition.  First, notice that having less trust in the 
government leads to more tolerance for corruption.  While this might seem contradictory to the 
reader, it is related to the perception of corruption as a cost.   That is, since these people do not 
trust the government and thus do not see it as efficient, they might have a world view, where 
corruption is tolerated because attempting to avoid corrupt practices will only lead to frustration.  
Similarly, note that being on the left side of the ideological spectrum, and living in smaller 
communities, also leads to an elevated lenience for corruption.  This is capturing the older 
generations shaped in the cardenista model accustomed to the priista modus operandi, who 
again see corruption as a necessary cost. 
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Table 8. Impact of Migrants on Corruption Attitudes, OLS Model 
 
 
Variable               Model 1    
  
 
Receives Remittances     .020    (.070)   
Lived in the USA      -.154*    (.085)   
Thinking about leaving the country    -.022    (.070)    
Knowledgeable       .049*    (.028)    
Informed       -.005*    (.012)     
Horizontal Trust       .043**    (.020)    
Institutional Trust       -.006*** (.002)   
Comm. Participation      -.011    (.009)   
Current gov. support      -.007    (.028)   
Ideological spectrum      -.003*** (.001)    
Age         .001     (002)      
Gender        .041    (.051)    
Education       -.015**  (.007)     
Catholic        -.027   .  (.023)     
Income        .010    (.011)       
Current Economic Situation of the Country   .030      (.028)    
Economic Forecast for the Country     -.005    (.040)     
Unemployment       -.072    (.047)    
Registered to vote      -.006    (.031)    
Constant         5.76*** (.254)      
Number of Observations     1238      
R2        .0406      
     
Dependent Variable: political participation (see additive index) 
All Prob>F  0.000 
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10 
 
 
 
  
In contrast, being part of a social network with people abroad is not enough to change 
people’s attitudes on this score.  Receiving remittances, in and of itself does little to modify 
people’s interpretation of what corruption entails.  Conversely, having lived abroad changes this 
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completely.  This is crucial, because as we saw from the first table, these people are likely to be 
related.  That is, those who left the country are likely to have received remittances themselves at 
a prior point.  In effect, this table has the strongest suggestion of attitude adjustment among 
immigrants, because in essence it is capturing the same people at different points in their lives. 
The reader might now consider the significance of our findings so far.  The tables above 
have shown that individuals who receive remittances are more likely to partake in different 
political activities and have an elevated sense of support for individuals who actively criticize the 
government.  On the other hand, the tables have also shown that having lived abroad matters for 
one’s sense of efficacy and tolerance for corruption.  Given the nature of the questions, this in 
effect suggests a further clue to how this process works.  The latter two results are actually 
tapping into attitudes more prone to changing.  As already discussed above, the immigration 
experience, even when relatively short can lead to a renewed sense of confidence, particularly 
when that person did so illegally, as one could hypothesize is at least partly the case for many of 
the data points in the survey.  Moreover, as also mentioned, one of the obvious things a migrant 
is bound to perceive is the clear difference in the most immediate of political outcomes, namely 
that of public services.  To be more precise, a migrant will probably notice the vast disparity in 
roads and infrastructure and conclude, however indirectly, that this probably has much to do with 
corruption.  Since the questions used this very scenario, it is not surprising that having lived in 
the United States proved significant. 
Likewise, the results associated with political participation and democratic attitudes hints 
that this process takes much longer, but that can be transmitted through social networks.  This is 
because the variable that proves significant in these cases has no time constraints.  We do not 
know how long they have been receiving remittances, or how long those abroad have been there.  
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We can, however, surmise a few things about those in the opposite end.  Although it is true that 
the longer an individual stays in the United States, the less likely it is that person will send 
remittances, it is also true that many of those sending remittances have been abroad before, 
making them more likely to have shifted their political attitudes.  Portes (1997) has also found 
that staying in the U.S. means more politicization and not necessarily waning interest in the 
country of origin, again suggesting that if they send remittances they would have more 
significant impact in their country of origin. 
Hence, I would argue that the lack of significance from the United States variable should 
not be understood as contradicting the overall argument of this dissertation.  In fact, I strongly 
suspect that a better dataset would, in fact, demonstrate that both factors mattered for the 
political outcomes analyzed here.  This suggests a further research avenue. 
 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
The transnational literature has suggested a link between immigration and democratization, a 
phenomenon that some scholars have termed social remittances.  And yet, scholars have been 
slow to scrutinize this relationship empirically, to a large extent because of a lack of data and 
difficulties in measuring its potential impact.  This chapter has made an initial attempt through an 
approach from the political behavior literature.  Specifically, the chapter argued that the 
immigration experience itself leads to a transformation in political attitudes, which in turn get 
transferred to the countries of origin through social networks and actual political participation 
when immigrants return home.  Moreover, I have shown that having contact with those abroad 
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has an impact on political involvement whether or not one has more tolerance for those who 
disagree with the government’s policy.  This chapter also showed that having actually been 
abroad will have less tolerance for corruption attitudes.  This, in effect, suggests that a hidden 
variable in the model, matters for the outcome, namely the length of time individuals spend 
abroad.  Likewise, as I mentioned in passing throughout the chapter, my field research in Mexico 
also provided further evidence for the thesis of this dissertation and additional cues as to why and 
how this process operates and despite its presence has not as of yet revolutionized the country.  
Further research is needed to examine statistically whether migrants make elections more 
competitive at the aggregate level, and to what extent this occurs in places with high 
concentration of migrants and remittances, also to consider the implications in the field.  This is 
where the dissertation now turns, in the next two chapters. 
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3.0  IMPACT OF MIGRANTS AT THE AGREGGATE LEVEL 
As shown in the previous chapter, life experience in the US, or presence as a node in migrant 
social networks—as evidenced by the proxy of receiving remittances—has a considerable impact 
on the political attitudes of those individuals and on their subsequent political behavior in their 
Latin American countries of origin.  The question remains, however, as to whether this has any 
significance in the aggregate.  That is, to what extent does the influence on the political behavior 
at the individual level matter for political outcomes in the countries of origin?  Does it make a 
difference at all, and if so, in which ways?  The following chapter will use a case from our 
previous Latin American country set, namely Mexico, to explore these questions in terms of 
participation, electoral competitiveness, the power of third parties, party incumbency and 
specific partisan outcomes in the 2006 Presidential election. 
 Mexico provides a natural laboratory to test the laid out theories for a number of 
reasons.  First, immigration data documenting the numbers of migrants who have returned and 
who remain in the US are nearly non-existent for most countries.  Fortunately, CONAPO, the 
National Population Council of Mexico, carried out a census in 2000 to establish these figures 
for the country as a whole including the percentage of households which have migrants in the US 
or have returned to Mexico for all 2443 municipios in the country.  Second, Mexican migrants 
have had a long presence in the US, and as such have already developed some institutional 
means to influence politics at the local level through the so-called hometown associations 
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(Alarcón 2000, Bada 2004, Graham 1997, Guarnizo 1998, Smith 2003).  Thus, one would expect 
that if migrants have any prospect at all to influence the political outcomes in their country of 
origin, Mexico would be the ideal candidate.  Third, unlike many other countries in Latin 
America, Mexico has had a long history of circular migration dating back to the Bracero program 
of the 1960s and earlier.  This means that in contrast to a number of other countries which might 
send their people abroad only to never see them return, Mexico has potential to have enough of 
return migrants to affect politics.  Finally, the sheer number of Mexican migrants in the US is 
impressive and continues to rise.  As of this writing, it is estimated that 20 million Mexicans live 
in the US1, about a sixth of the greater Mexican nation.  In addition, the recent economic turmoil 
and the toughening of immigration policy has forced thousands to return, so that the country is 
facing an unprecedented number of return migrants. Again, more than any country in Latin 
America, Mexico provides the perfect laboratory to test our hypotheses. 
3.1 THE ARGUMENT 
As explained in detail in the theoretical chapter, migrants can act as the conduits of political 
values for a number of reasons.  First, migrants are prone to changing their attitudes because of 
their youth, contextual influences and relationship with the host country and other immigrants.  
In fact, evidence that attitudes change as a result of socialization in the host country has already 
surfaced both directly (Camp 2003, Dancygier and Saunders 2006), and indirectly (Levitt and 
Waters 2002), but as I mentioned in the previous chapter no work has explored the impact of this 
                                                 
1 This estimate includes individuals born in the US of Mexican parents and Mexican citizens living in the US legally 
or illegally.   
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socialization on their countries of origin.  Second, the technological advances of the last twenty 
years allow migrants today to have more efficient means of maintaining contact with their 
homeland.  Hence, cultural, economic and political ties do not necessarily become thinner 
overtime, as they once did with the diasporas of the early 20th century, and thus, the potential for 
these networks to transmit political ideas exists today, more than ever.  Thus, to reiterate the 
argument: individuals migrate.  This leads to the opportunity of attitude change concomitant to 
the local context and personal experience, which results in behavioral transformations.  In turn, 
these ideas are channeled back to the country of origin, which, as a result, experiences political 
impact.  This chapter will test this argument in one country of origin—Mexico—the extent to 
which this change has already occurred. 
 
3.2 THE HYPOTHESES 
Having shown the specific attitudes that change as a result of the migration experience to the 
United States and elsewhere in the previous chapter, the issue then becomes what particular 
political outcomes we might expect to change and in which ways.  In electoral terms, first, one 
might consider the demand side.  As discussed in the previous chapter, return migrants 
experience a higher political efficacy than those who never left the country.  One of the reasons 
lies in the fact that having survived through the challenging ordeal of living in a country with 
unfamiliar culture and language—oftentimes without the benefit of having done so legally—
migrants are more likely than their non-migrant neighbors of comparable social class, to feel that 
they are in charge of their own lives, and that they need not wait for fate to intervene.  Moreover, 
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as we will discuss in detail in the qualitative chapter, migrants are likely to have altered demands 
on public goods, as having lived in developed countries makes them more sensitive than non-
migrants to government service deficiencies.  Hence, one often hears that as soon as they return, 
migrants routinely complain about the inadequacies in garbage management, and about the 
scarce respect for traffic regulations on the part of both regular citizens and authorities.  Finally, 
as shown on the previous chapter, migrants are also likely to have contrasting views on 
democratic aspects of government, particularly as related to the legitimacy of people engaging in 
corrupt practices whether for personal or public gain.   
From the above discussion, we can gather that migrants, given their sense of political 
efficacy, will be more likely to participate.  Still, would their rate of participation increase 
equally across all electoral levels?  Given that their altered demands tend to be of a local nature, 
and that they would have more access to the local process, one could expect that their 
participation would augment more at the local than national levels.  Related to this, one could 
anticipate that migrants would be particularly sensitive to the local government performance and 
that they would not hesitate to hold the incumbent government accountable with their vote, 
especially if they perceive it as corrupt. Although the option to hold a specific individual 
accountable does not exist in Mexico, because of the reelection prohibition at all government 
levels, it can be reasonably assumed that voters will still display their displeasure against the 
incumbent party.  Still, Levitt’s theoretical model suggests that not all ideas will be transferred 
equally, and that the local receiving context actively shapes its impact.  More specifically, she 
argues that the potential ramifications of social remittances depend on “the gender, class, and 
life-cycle stage of the receiver.  Individuals with more resources and power, and who therefore 
control more aspects of their lives, have more freedom with which to accept or reject [social] 
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remittances.” (2001: 67). Translated to our aggregate model, one can hypothesize that the 
interaction of a municipio‘s marginality will have an effect on the potential political outcomes. 
These two factors, then, can lead us to formulate our first two hypotheses on the demand side of 
electoral outcomes: 
H1  Participation at the local level will be higher in municipios with a larger number 
of migrants. 
 
H2  Rate of party incumbency will be lower in municipios with a larger number of 
migrants. 
 
Following this line of thought, it could be expected that participation, altered demands 
and distinct political attitudes might have an impact on two other facets of the demand side of 
electoral outcomes, namely the competitiveness in elections and the voting percentage attained 
by smaller parties.  First, in the case of the latter, one could hypothesize that as political opinion 
becomes more diverse and as the number of voters in search of accountability grows, parties will 
find it increasingly difficult to completely dominate electoral outcomes, and the local political 
fiefdoms that remain in the country will begin to be dismantled.  I would expect this to be 
particularly true in places like Oaxaca and Puebla, where to this day, the PRI retains significant 
advantage over its rivals, mostly as a remnant of the ancien régime.  The other side of this 
phenomenon is that return migrants could potentially find that none of the currently strong 
parties in their municipio truly address their new formulated concerns and demands, and thus 
they might pave the way for the growth in alternative parties.  This is important because while at 
present the Mexican national landscape features three major parties, competition at the state level 
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usually remains between two, which in turn boosts the possibility of clientelistic ties and outright 
corruption.  Thus, we can offer two additional hypotheses: 
H3  Competitiveness will be higher in municipios with a larger number of migrants . 
 
H4  Voting percentage for third parties will be higher in municipios with a larger 
number of migrants. 
 
 Finally, before moving on to the supply side of political outcomes, we should 
consider the role of the state governor in local elections.  Presently, the municipio has little 
political power and depends almost entirely on funds allotted by the central and state 
governments.  The latter gives a vast amount of power to the governor because although 
mandated to distribute them equally, they have enormous discretion on the matter.  Furthermore, 
govenors have every incentive to favor municipios run by the party or parties in theircoalition, 
because it will not be long before they have to run for a completely different political office and 
they will need the blessing of their party for the nomination—something rarely done without 
strong local support.  This is particularly true in the second half of their term when their political 
future will be decided.  Given that all presidentes municipales terms last three years and run 
concurrently with the governor, those municipios run by the governor’s coalition should receive 
more funds than their neighbors, all things being equal, in an effort to maintain fellow partisans 
in power at the local level.2  From this, one could conclude that in the midterm state election for 
the local county executives, those candidates running under the party label of the governor’s 
                                                 
2 Of course, the governor might also engage in strategic allotting of funds to municipios which they believes could 
potentially come into the fold of his party, but doing that risks voters recognizing that the one responsible for the 
funds is the governor and not the presidente municipal. 
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coalition should be more likely to win.  But what about the role of migrants, however?  First, 
return migrants or even migrants living abroad that might influence the vote might not 
necessarily know about the additional public spending in the municipio.  In fact, those 
individuals might judge the performance of their local government on considerations different 
than those of non-migrants.  For example, they might consider to vote or not for the incumbent 
party based on issues pertaining much more to the ability of the local government, such as an 
efficient traffic control, a cleaner city, an accessible government and a non-corrupt police force.  
Here, I do not mean to imply that non-migrants might not consider those issues as well, the 
simple point is that they would weight those considerations differently.  From this, we can derive 
our fifth and sixth hypotheses: 
H5  Incumbents will be more likely to be voted out of office in municipios with 
higher levels of migrants. 
H6  County executives of the same party as the governor will be more likely to be 
voted out of office in municipios with higher levels of migrants. 
 We can now look into the supply side of possible electoral outcomes.  The first 
place we should look is the number of parties, and positing whether the political behavior 
changes brought about by migrants might generate new parties willing to channel this group’s 
concerns.  The Mexican context, however, does not provide fertile ground for the appearance of 
new parties based on migrants’ demands.   There are a number of reasons for this.  First, 
although a growing part of the electorate, migrants as a political cleavage remains too small and 
localized to sustain a political party.  Put another way, although potentially significant in shifting 
elections and providing accountability, no party could win an election based on their votes alone.  
Second, political issues that might be classified as of particular interest to migrants are already 
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part of the political discourse and all major parties support them.  For example, all major political 
actors in Mexico support comprehensive immigration reform in the United States.  The last two 
presidents and the partisan leaders in Congress have all spoken about the importance of Mexican 
migrants, with President Fox calling them heroes that make Mexico great with their efforts and 
remittances (Sánchez 2005).  Moreover, the Mexican government has been particularly keen in 
developing programs that might interest migrants, including the Paisano program, which 
provides information and support for visiting migrants, and the three for one program, which 
matches every dollar remitted with three dollars from the local, state and central levels of 
government.  Therefore, there would be little a new party could offer in terms of potential 
migrant issues. 
 Nevertheless, there is another supply side aspect that migrants do have the 
potential to have an impact, namely the number of candidates running at the local level.  
Although rare, state parties do exist in Mexico, as do six other smaller national parties.  
Depending on the local context, these parties have to choose whether to run independently or be 
part of a larger coalition generally associated with one of the three major parties.  Certainly, the 
relative electoral strength plays a role in that decision, but oftentimes the decision lies on 
whether or not the party has a candidate and the minimum staff to run a campaign.  This is where 
the migrants play a role because they might provide electoral strength either if migrants become 
disillusioned with the three major parties or find that none of them speak to their particular local 
concerns.  Likewise, return migrants might provide a good recruiting source for candidates, both 
because they tend to be wealthier than their neighbors and because of their potential preference 
to enter politics but with a new political voice.  In this way, we reach our final hypothesis: 
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H7  The number of candidates will be higher in municipios with a larger number of 
migrants. 
This can only hold true at the local level, given that in presidential elections all 
municipios must have, by law, the exact same number of candidates, while in elections for 
senators and deputies there is not enough variance across states. Having established the context, 
we can now move to the operationalization of our variables. 
 
3.3 METHODS AND DATA 
To test the above hypotheses, this chapter will employ two commonly used statistical models: 
Ordinary Least Squares and Logit Regression.  The former will be used for the majority of tables 
given the continuous nature of most electoral variables at the municipio level, along with the 
Huber-White estimates for robust standard errors.  The latter will be used for cases where the 
dependent variable is a dummy, as in the case of party incumbency.  Let me now explain how 
each variable was constructed. 
 
3.3.1 The dependent variables 
All the dependent variables came from the electoral records kept by the IFE (Instituto 
Federal Electoral, Federal Electoral Institute), the independent board of elections, and its 
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equivalent at the state level, for all thirty two states in the country.4  To avoid endogeneity all 
elections used in the models occurred after 2000.  In the case of local voting, I generally tried to 
use the election immediately after 2000, which for the most part happened to be the states’ 
midterm elections.5  
It is possible to explore the potential impact of migrants on participation because the IFE 
keeps a very meticulous lista nominal (list of registered voters) that is often revised and often 
recognized for its accuracy.  Thus, participation is simply the actual number of votes divided by 
the number on the lista nominal.  Regrettably, not all local state electoral boards keep as rigorous 
records as the IFE, so the dataset I used lacked participation data for some municipios in two 
states (Chiapas and Veracruz). Fortunately, this did not prevent the model from having enough 
data points with more than 1400 available from the other states.   
Based on the elections described above, the incumbent party measure was a simple 
dummy variable coded 1 for the incumbent and 0 otherwise.  In the case of coalitions, I 
considered it to be an incumbent if any of the parties from the previous coalition remained in 
office in the next election.  This was a fairly simple exercise because there were no minor 
incumbent parties that either, stayed on by themselves, or switched alliances with another major 
party and won.7  Similarly, the governor’s incumbent party was a dummy variable coded 1 for 
the incumbent and 0 otherwise.  Here, I also deemed a party an incumbent if the political faction 
                                                 
4 This data has been compiled by a political consulting company and is available at: 
http://www.imocorp.com.mx/CAMPO/zSIEM/ELEC_X_ANIO/ResultadosWeb.asp 
5 The specific elections I used were: Aguascalientes 2003, Baja California 2004, Baja California Sur 2005, 
Campeche 2003, Chiapas 2004, Chihuahua 2004, Coahuila 2005, Colima 2003, Distrito Federal 2003, Durango 
2004, Guanajuato 2003, Guerrero 2005, Hidalgo 2005, Jalisco 2003, México 2003, Michoacán 2004, Morelos 2003, 
Nayarit 2005, Nuevo León 2003, Oaxaca 2004, Puebla 2004, Querétaro 2003, Quintana Roo 2005 , San Luis Potosí 
2003, Sinaloa 2004, Sonora 2003, Tabasco 2003, Tamaulipas 2004, Tlaxcala 2004, Veracruz 2004, Yucatán 2006, 
Zacatecas 2004.  For national elections, I used the 2003 Legislative elections and the 2006 Presidential elections.  
7 The major parties in question are the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), PAN (Partido Acción Nacional), 
or PRD (Partido Revolucionario Democrático). 
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that won the local midterm election belonged in the coalition that elected the governor.  Again, in 
this case, there were no cases where a minority party in the governor’s coalition won at the local 
level, while also alternating their alliance with another major party. 
The competitiveness figure I used resulted from subtracting the vote percentages of the 
top two parties in the election.  Therefore, the possible range could go from 0.1 to 100, with the 
former being the most competitive.  I did the same for competitiveness at the national level.  This 
was possible because the IFE’s records include the electoral results disaggregated to the 
municipio level for both Congressional and Presidential elections.  Likewise, I measured the 
power of third parties by adding the top two percentages and subtracting from 100, as indicated 
elsewhere (Moreno-Jaimes 2007).  The resultant range expanded from 0 to 72%, the latter being 
the highest percentage obtained by third parties in any municipio in Mexico. 
 
3.3.2 The independent variables 
As mentioned at the outset, the main source of data for the independent variables of 
interest in this chapter comes from the migration records that CONAPO (Consejo Nacional de 
Población, National Population Council) developed for all municipios in Mexico.  These figures, 
in turn, stem from additional work carried out during the 2000 census that interviewed 2.2 
million households in the country.3  The dataset has information on a number of important 
theoretical facets of the dissertation using the household as the main unit of analysis.  
Specifically, the CONAPO statistics included the percentages of all households that received 
                                                 
3 The methodological details and data are available at http://www.conapo.gob.mx. 
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remittances, had migrants in the United States, and had return migrants, as well as circular 
migrants.  The report defined the various groups in this manner.  The figure on remittances 
included any household that had at least one member receive cash from individuals abroad.  It 
did not include non-liquid assets.  The data on migrants in the US comprised any households that 
had at least one member living permanently in American territory.  The numbers on return 
migrants encompassed any households that had at least one member who had lived in the US for 
more than five years and now had a permanent address in Mexico.  Finally, the statistics on 
circular migrants consisted of any households that had at least one member who had lived in the 
US for less than five years—that is, since the last census, and now resided in Mexico.  
The rest of the independent variables were supplemented from other CONAPO datasets 
and the 2000 census data created by the INEGI (National Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Information).  Among these were control variables related to population, such as the female, 
indigenous, and catholic percentages for each municipio in the country.  I should clarify, 
however, that the indigenous figure is not a raw measure of the whole indigenous population in 
the municipio, but rather a household based number that documents whether the main 
breadwinner in a household speaks an indigenous language.  Moreover, I also included statistics 
related to employment and age distribution.  Because no numbers for the unemployment rate at 
the municipio level exist in Mexico, I used employment figures that measured whether anyone 
regardless of age held a job that paid at least minimum wage.8  It should be noted, then, that 
these data do not distinguish between children and adults or between full and part time 
employment.  Neither do they capture dissatisfaction with the job, variation in pay grades, or 
                                                 
8 The minimum wage in 2000 was $97.35 per day (in 2002 pesos), roughly $9.60 in today’s (2008) dollars.  Source: 
Secretaría del Trabajo and Banco de México.  
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whether people were actively pursuing jobs and were not hired.9  Likewise, it was theoretically 
important to incorporate a variable dealing with age distribution in the models given that those 
who leave the country tend to be younger, not to mention that only 18 year olds are allowed to 
vote, hence, any regressions that did not take this into account would be inaccurate.  Therefore, I 
include the percentage for the adult population in all municipios.   
The size of the municipio is in square kilometers.  I chose to include this in the statistical 
models for two reasons.  First, it could be argued that all things being equal, the spread of ideas 
would take longer to disseminate the larger the geographical area they had to cover.  That is, two 
municipios with identical populations, migration rates and marginality, but varying size would 
not present the same opportunity for migrants’ changed attitudes to influence local concerns and 
discourse.  Second, no clear statistical figures to capture the urban/rural divide in the country 
exist.  Using size and number of households, however, allows us to attain a better approximation.  
The municipios’ geographical dimensions come from the INEGI and the Enciclopedia de los 
municipios de México.  
In order to control for the potential level of opportunity and the wide differences among 
and within states in terms of wealth and marginality, I included in the models below four distinct 
measures: educational attainment gaps, marginality, human index and social development index.  
This is critical because we know that poverty matters both for electoral outcomes and for 
migration levels.  Consequently, without a proper account of these dynamics any findings might 
be the result of these underlying factors rather than the impact of migrants’ behavior.   
The first one is a single measure.  As the label might imply, the education number is the 
percentage of households that have at least one member which did not finish middle school 
                                                 
9 This was also the reason I did not simply subtract the employed population from the unemployed population to 
create an unemployment figure. 
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(secundaria).  Although theoretically possible to have a municipio boasting a citizenry with 15% 
or less of households with a member that did not finish middle school, no such municipio exists 
in Mexico, hence the scale is actually between 34 and 100%.  The last three are more complex 
indexes formulated by the National Population Council.  The first one, marginality, is the result 
of an algorithm developed to capture the different aspects of poverty and its impact on Mexican 
communities.  Accordingly, the numbers included the illiterate population older than 15, in 
addition to households without access to electricity, the sewer or the water system.  It also took 
into account the level of crowdedness in households, whether or not the household contained dirt 
floors, the kind of income the household enjoyed, among others. 10  Once this was determined, 
CONAPO used optimal stratification techniques to come up with specific cutoff points that 
would clearly differentiate the level of marginality between the municipios.  These cutoff points 
yielded the following figures: Very Low (-2.44 / -1.28), Low (-1.28 / -0.69), Medium (-0.69 / -
0.11), High (-0.11 / 1.05) and Very High (1.05 / 3.38) marginality levels.  Thus, the actual 
possible margin is from -2.44 to 3.38, and in terms of the actual distribution, CONAPO 
identified 247 municipios with very high levels of marginality, 417 with high levels, 486 with 
medium levels, 986 with high levels, and 386 with very high.  
The second of the complex figures is the human development index measure. This is 
reminiscent of the first but intended to capture the obstacles that individuals face in lieu of 
realizing their full potential as human beings.  It comprises average life expectancy, likelihood of 
surviving the first year of life, GDP per capita counted in current dollars, average level of 
education and the quality of education in the municipio as expressed in number of teachers and 
schools available in the community.  Finally, the social development index is a figure meant as a 
                                                 
10 Please see the Appendix for details. 
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more comprehensive measure of poverty and obstacles to social welfare.  This one, in turn, takes 
into account the material used in the household’s floor; the sex, age and level of education of the 
main breadwinner; whether or not any member of the household uses social services, whether or 
not individuals in the household own a stove, a car, or a fridge; the number of children under 12 
in the household; the number of children between 5 and 15 who attend school; and the number of 
children between 5 and 15 who work.  It also has equivalent cutoff points to the marginality 
figure which are as follows: 0.8 or more is high, 0.65 to 0.799 is medium high, 0.5 to 0.649 is 
medium low and anything below 0.5 is low. Thus, the actual range used in the table is .122 to 
.848.   
From the above description, perhaps it could be argued that using all these figures in the 
statistical models could lead to multicollinearity given that they are intended to measure a similar 
underlying phenomenon.  Although a valid concern, I decided to include them in the models for 
a number of reasons.  First, while it is true that these numbers attempt to measure similar 
dynamics, they are not indistinguishable.  That is, marginality might be highly correlated with 
gaps in educational attainment in a given municipio, but they are not identical.  Second, the last 
three measures are not raw figures but complex indexes that CONAPO created with different 
weights according to different underlying statistical constructs.  In other words, although a 
number for GDP per capita is also used in the human development index, the numbers are not 
equal, because in the latter it is a weighted part of a larger logarithm.  Finally, as stated before, 
given the causal impact of poverty on both migration and certain aspects of political behavior, I 
wanted to have robust measures allowing us to discern the actual impact of migrants’ changed 
political attitudes.   
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There are two other important variables to discuss.  First, I included a dummy variable 
for the border region.  The measure assigns a 1 to any municipio belonging to a state that borders 
the US, and 0 otherwise.  Two theoretical reasons motivate this decision.  First, scholars have 
recognized for some time political culture differences between the Mexican North and South.  
This is especially true for the states bordering the US, which tend to be wealthier and have long 
displayed an independent streak.  It was here, for instance, that the PRI first lost its grip on the 
state governorships in Baja California and Chihuahua.  It was also this region that produced the 
two major figures that altered the PRI’s course in modern times, namely Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari, and Ernesto Zedillo.11  Second, given the proximity to the United States, one might 
expect that more than any other region in the country, the average person in this area might come 
into contact with situations, social networks or political contexts reminiscent of those that lead 
migrants to shift their political attitudes.  Therefore, it is necessary to control for any potential 
idiosyncrasy in this region.   
Lastly, I included a measure for the number of crimes reported in a municipio. Crime has 
been a main concern in recent Mexican elections, and, as such, could be hypothesized to have an 
impact on participation and party incumbency.  The ideal measure could be perhaps a figure that 
captured the perception of insecurity a municipio as a whole felt, unfortunately, no such number 
exists for the country as a whole.  Another valid criticism is the expectation the crime statistics 
used in the models are probably underreported.  While this seems a reasonable assumption, as 
already mentioned, no better figures exist.  Having concluded the operationalization of our 
variables, we can now move on to the statistical models.  This is what follows. 
                                                 
11 Salinas grew up in Nuevo León, the state his father represented in the Mexican Senate.  Zedillo grew up in 
Mexicali, Baja California where his family emigrated to when he was three. 
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3.4 DISCUSSION 
Before engaging fully in the details of our statistical models, let us describe the descriptive 
aspects of the data so the reader may better understand some of the important conclusions 
reached.  This is reported on table 1.   
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable    Mean  St. Dv.  Min.   Max 
   
 
Households                 9267.216 28800.04 33             427592 
 
Households (Remittances)  6.53  7.70   0   53.7   
 
Households (USA)   6.35      6.85   0   46.7 
  
Households (Return)   1.17     1.77      0      17.8  
  
Marginality      -.001      1.00  -2.4  3.4   
       
Educational Gap   89.2  30.1  34.0  100 
  
    
 
The first thing to note is that although the mean is relatively low for all migrant measures, and  
 
particularly so for households with return migrants, the range is quite large for the first two and  
 
relatively high for return migrants.  It should also be noted that the mean figure hides the 
geographical focus with which these figures manifest in real life.  This is important because, 
while the numbers might be small, their compactness allows for more of an impact than a mean 
number might suggest. This is evident from the maps reported below.  Figure 1, for instance, 
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reports the distribution of households with migrants in the United States as a function of state 
population.12  As the reader can see, the number of migrants is not distributed equally across the  
country, but rather appears centralized, particularly around the states of Zacatecas, Guanajuato  
and Michoacán, states which not coincidentally have a large amount of migrant hometown 
organizations.   The other two maps exhibit an analogous pattern, displaying in particular the low  
migrant figures for most of the Southeast.  Nevertheless, it should also be observed that while 
highly correlated, the maps are not identical, and that a number of states do not have figures that 
match exactly.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mexican Households with Individuals Living in the USA 
 
For example, Querétaro has almost 8% of its households with a member in the United States,  
 
                                                 
12 Because these maps report the state population as a whole, the percentage range is much lower than in the 
municipio figures used in the statistical tables above.  
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but only 4% receive remittances.  Likewise, Baja California, has a very low percentage of 
households with members in the US, but a very high number with return migrants.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mexican Households who Receive Remittances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mexican Households with Return Migrants 
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In regard to the non-migrant measures of importance in the statistical tables, the reader 
might conjecture as to their relationship.  Specifically, the reader might speculate as to the nature 
of poverty in some of these municipios, and whether that is the cause for high number of 
migrants in the first place.  To answer this question, the following graphs are provided. 
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Figure 4. Marginality –Households USA 
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Figure 5. Education Gap – Households USA 
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As can be observed in these graphs, no perfect correlation exists, but rather a tipping 
point concentrated around a high level of marginality and broad gap in educational attainment.  
That is, while even at a low level of marginality households have members leaving for the 
United States, it is only once the marginality measure hits the medium level (near the -0.69 
number) that the figure for households with migrants in the US explodes.  Likewise, municipios 
where a large number of individuals have not completed their basic education is not associated 
with a large figure of households with migrants in the USA until the 90% figure, which non-
coincidentally is also highly correlated with marginality levels.13  Thus, we can conclude that 
municipios with large number of households with members in the United States are more 
marginal than average, and have large percentages of their population that never completed high 
school (secundaria).  
Having described the nature of the municipios we can proceed with the discussion. The 
investigation into the potential impact of migrants’ social remittances should commence with one 
of the factors that proved significant at the individual level in the previous chapter, namely 
participation.  Hence, the first table to consider is the OLS model in the figure reported below. 
As it can be observed, the table consists of three different models.  The first one contains 
the full regression without any interaction terms.  The other two include the addition of local 
context interactions as suggested by Levitt’s theoretical model.  The initial thing the reader might 
notice is that the first model shows results that contradict our hypotheses, namely that 
households with return migrants and those in the US have a negative sign.  This means that they 
are more likely to not vote in local elections.  How can this be? 
                                                 
13 The correlation levels is 0.78. 
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It is certainly possible that the migration experience influenced people to the point that 
they would opt to exit of the political system altogether, either because they surmised that local 
voting would have little impact, or because they find it too corrupt.  Likewise, a similar data 
problem to the one encountered in the previous chapter might exist.  Both figures, for example, 
could hide discrepancies that make it look as though there is lower participation.  This is because 
the figures are based on a voting list in future elections (those after 2000) and thus it might 
include individuals who are no longer in the country, or no longer in that municipio.  The latter, I 
discovered is particularly true with return migrants who grow accustomed to a certain lifestyle 
and who initially might return to a rural area only to leave for a more urban setting as soon as 
possible. Before concluding this to be the case, it is worth looking at the other two models which 
interact the migrant measures with key aspects of the local context.  The two interactive variables 
chosen here are chosen for a couple of reason.  The first one, educational attainment gap, aims to 
capture the underlying inclination for individuals to accept or reject a potential social remittance.  
The second one, marginality, attempts to include the resource context where an idea might 
propagate faster.  As explained in the introduction of the hypotheses, they also aim to capture 
Levitt’s idea of class and the availability of resources.  Once taken into we get some noteworthy 
results. 
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Table 10. Impact of Mexican Migrants on Political Participation at the Local Level, OLS Model 
 
 
Variable   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
   
 
Households      -.001*** (.001)    -.001*** (.001)   -.001*** (.001)      
Households (Remittances) -.102     (.062) 2.75**     (1.31) -.135**    (.066)  
Households (USA)  -.157**    (.071) -2.97**   (1.20) -.193***  (.069)   
Households (Return)  -.585***   (.219) -7.44*     (4.33) -.350*      (.225)   
% Female pop.  -1.19***   (.302) 1.05***  (.297) -.951***  (.297)    
% Indigenous household  .076***   (.016) .074***  (.016)  .077***   (.017)  
% Catholics pop.   .071**      (.034) .071**    (.034)  .068**    (.034)  
 % Employed     .094       (.070)  .132*     (.071)  .151**    (.073)  
% Adults (over 18)  .545***    (.092) .520***  (.094)  .526***  (.093)  
Size of municipio  in km2 -. 001***  (.001) -.001*** (.001) -.001***  (.001)  
% Educational att. gap  .327***    (.058) .316***  (.062)  .397***   (.063)  
Marginality   6.44***    (1.29)  6.37*** (1.31)   5.37***  (1.37)  
Human Development Index 26.01**    (11.63) 22.86*    (11.69)   20.01*     (11.39)  
Social Development Index 32.98***  (9.58) 36.30*** (9.61)   37.27***  (9.59)  
Crime Frequency  .003       (.002) .003     (.002)  .003           (.002)  
Border States   -5.75***   (.930) -5.74***  (.925)  -5.63***   (.916)  
Remittances X Ed. gap    -.032**    (.014)     
USA X Ed. gap     .030**      (.013)     
Return X Ed. gap     .076      (.047)     
Marginality X Remittances          -.210**  (.107)  
Marginality X USA           .251*      (.096) 
Marginality X Return           .671*      (.373) 
Constant   20.54   14.82      12.65   
 R2     0.3207   0.3260      0.3281   
Observations    1497    1497      1497   
    
Dependent Variable: Participation in local elections for county executive (presidente municipal) 
All F Prob= 0.0000    
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p <.10* 
 
 
First, consider the interaction with an educational attainment gap.  The reader might 
recall that this variable consists of households where at least one of their members has not 
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finished middle school (secundaria) and that its lowest possible point is 34.  Thus, an 
examination of the interaction slope reveals that for each additional unit of remittances, where 
the gap is at its lowest, those municipios have 1.7% higher turnout.  As the gap increases, so does 
the participation level, but it still remains significant and positive until the 75% range.   If 
Mexico somehow managed to lower this education gap, each municipio could see even higher 
turnout. This is clearly shown in figure 6 below, which display the conditional coefficients for 
the interactions of the various migrant measures.  Here, it should be noted that in all subsequent 
graphs, only the significant conditional coefficients will be reported, unless otherwise noted.  
Undoubtedly, the reader might be skeptical about what appears to be a miniscule addition to the 
voting turnout percentage.  Still, one might note that in local races where turnout tends to be low 
in any case, this could, in fact, make much of a difference.    
 
   
Figure 6. Impact of Migrants on Local Participation (Interaction with Ed. Gap) 
(All coefficients significant to the .10 level) 
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Take the municipio of Ojocaliente, one of the municipios I visited in Zacatecas to carry 
out the qualitative work of this dissertation, for instance.  In the election immediately prior to the 
time when these migrant figures were taken—the one for 1998—the county executive election 
was carried by 99 votes.  A mere 2% additional voter turnout would have resulted in an 
additional 227 votes to dispute.  The other two interactions are more nuanced.    The variable for 
households with members in the US, for example, suggests that as the gap grows, the initial loss 
in voter turnout diminishes.  This implies that as the population lags more and more in education, 
the voting turnout still dwindles but less so because of the influence of some of their citizens 
abroad, and those who have returned.  Interestingly, return migrants seem to a much larger 
influence than migrants in the US.  In fact, as migrants return to locations with wider and wider 
education gaps, voter turnout goes from a negative 5% to a less alarming negative 0.6%   
On the other hand, the reader might rather consider the marginality interaction shown on 
Figure 7.  To remind the reader, marginality is based on an algorithm created by the Mexican 
Census whereby a number of cutoff points describe various level of marginality.  These are Very 
Low (-2.44 / -1.28), Low (-1.28 / -0.69), Medium (-0.69 / -0.11), High (-0.11 / 1.05) and Very 
High (1.05 / 3.38).   
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Figure 7. Impact of Migrants on Local Participation (Interaction with Marginality) 
All coefficients significant to the 0.10 level 
 
All of the subsequent graphs using marginality will use these cutoff points for reference.  
Let us now read the graph.  Consider first the USA variable.  Here, an additional percent of 
households with members in the U.S. coincides with what we found on the education gap 
interaction.  That is, as marginality grows, Mexicans abroad have a negative impact on 
participation, but it diminishes the poorer the place becomes.  This impact, however, becomes 
insignificant once the variable surpasses the medium level of marginality (-0.11).   Likewise, 
Return Migrants has a similar impact, but once marginality becomes chronic, it becomes a 
positive effect.  In the most marginal of places, in fact, it reaches a deceptively modest 0.6%.  
This is because these numbers in terms of local politics are huge.  Again, to take another 
example from a place I visited to carry out field work, consider Domingo Arenas in Puebla.  An 
additional 5.6% turnout rate in the election of 1998 would have produced an additional 309 
votes, while that election’s margin of victory was a mere 66 votes.   
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A more surprising outcome is the one shown by remittances.  What we find is that as 
marginality becomes exceptionally high, so does voter absenteeism, the very opposite of what 
we found with education gap.  This suggests that the lack of formal education might not be as 
important obstacle in creating political efficacy in some individuals than chronic poverty. 
Another interesting way to show this is to use King et. al.’s method (2000) to generate the 
predicted probabilities reported in the following table.   
The first number reported is the probability when all other variables are held at their 
mean.  The subsequent numbers are taking each of the independent variables of interest at 
various points, while holding all the other variables at their mean.  What we find in the first 
model that has education gap interactions, the level of remittances is augmented, individuals 
increase their local participation.  Contrast this with having migrants in the US, or individuals 
who have returned, who in fact, seem to lower participation. 
 
Table 11. Predicted Probabilities for Participation at the Local Level 
 
 
 
Model Variable Mean 1% 5% 10%  
 
2.  All variables at their mean 59.8  
Interaction 
Educ. Gap % of  Households Remittances  40.6 52.2 66.8 
 
 % of  Households USA  61.5 60.4 59.0 
 
  % of  Households Return         60.3 55.9    50.3 
 
3.   All variables at their mean  59.8 
Interaction 
Marginality % of Household Remittances         60.6 60.2     59.9 
   
% of Households USA         60.9 60.2     59.3 
 
  % of Households Return         60.4 58.9          57.0 
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The third model tells a slightly different story.  While the remittances-marginality 
interaction remains negative, only one of the components retains a positive sign.  If one inspects 
the slope of the line, maintaining marginality constant, but increasing the various migrant 
measures, they echo the previous model.  This time, however, although remittances prove 
significant at initial levels, they are actually associated with a negative impact on participation.  
An inspection of the actual numbers for predicted probabilities exhibits an essentially flat rate for 
participation, and lowered participation when the municipio experiences higher percentages of 
migrants abroad, in addition to those who have returned.  This suggests that remittances can 
contribute to an increase in participation, depending on the social context of the municipio. 
Still, given the differences among the various migrant measures, it is necessary to 
consider the contrasting outcomes.  How could it be, for example, that in the interaction between 
remittances and marginality, boosting the percentage of households that receive remittances 
lowers participation, while augmenting the number of households with individuals in the United 
States increases it?  Does this not prove that remittances are not an appropriate social network 
proxy?  Actually, the numbers reinforce it, and prove consistent with our hypotheses.  Consider 
that the remittance interaction figures relayed earlier are controlling for both households with 
individuals in the US and households with return migrants.  Consequently, the data is suggesting 
that enlarging the percentage of households while maintaining an equal number of households 
with migrants in the US and return migrants does little to boost participation, and in fact 
eventually lowers it.  This is because, in effect, the same individuals would be acting as conduits 
for a larger amount of households, with an ever weakening connection, and thus, with little 
influence.  This could be because enthusiasm for politics in poorer places tends to be lower, and 
thus, even a miniscule increase of citizens with a higher sense of political efficacy could lead to 
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increased turnout.  On the other hand, lower participation by return migrants at the local level 
could be attributed to frustration with local authorities, distrust of the system, or an assimilation 
of the American trend, whereby national elections receive more interest from the electorate than 
local races.  
To explore this further, I regressed identical variables, but using participation numbers at 
the national level, specifically from the 2003 election of the lower chamber deputies.13 Once 
more, we find that the remittance figure plays a significant role in the level of participation.  
Concretely, the figure suggests a 0.2% positive impact on participation.  Again, this is a small 
amount to be sure, but one that could have a significant impact given the mixed electoral system 
that decides deputies in Mexico, which combines first past the post system with proportional 
representation.  The other two figures, on the other hand, seem consistent with previous findings, 
as the US figure displays a negative sign, while the return migrant variable appears insignificant.  
Before concluding this to be the main migrant impact, it is necessary to look further within the 
interaction models. 
Let us again look at the education gap interaction first.  As shown on figure 8, a new 
pattern emerges, more congruous with the classic political behavior argument of resource 
availability (Verba and Nie 1972).  That is, in all of the cases, the poorer the area, the more 
difficult it is for any social remittance aspect to take root.  Still, wide differences exist.  For 
instance, the remittance figure unveils a positive effect of nearly 0.3%, but only where the gap 
covers roughly 80% of the households in the municipio, which then declines gradually.  
Elsewhere, the variable for those in the U.S. maintains a nearly identical pattern to that shown 
                                                 
13 Chamber deputies in Mexico are elected every three years and cannot run for reelection.  Senators run 
concurrently with the President and enjoy six year terms. 
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previously, to the point where at the lowest point in the education gap, those abroad contribute a 
1.7% lower turnout.  Return migrants show an absolute contrast.  At the lowest point in 
education attainment gap, return migrants chip in an eye-popping 8.9% to political participation.  
In fact, although it follows an overall decreasing pattern, it maintains its positive significance 
well past the mean, to a still impressive 1.7% where the gap covers 80% of the households.   
 
Table 12. Impact of Migrants on Political Participation at the National Level, OLS Model 
 
 
Variable   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
   
 
Households      -.001***  (.001)    -.001*** (.001)   -.001*** (.001)      
Households (Remittances)  .279***   (.075) 5.69     (1.25)  .215***    (.076)  
Households (USA)  -.199***   (.078) -1.90    (1.21) -.161**     (.079)   
Households (Return)   -.183        (.253)  14.1*** (4.18) -.154        (.247)   
% Female pop.  -1.30***   (.276) -1.27***  (.280) -.129***  (.279)    
% Indigenous household  .072***   (.014) .071***  (.013)   .069***   (.013)  
% Catholics pop.   .154***     (.029) .146***   (.029)  .149***   (.029)  
 % Employed     .037       (.069)  .007     (.071)  -.003**    (.071)  
% Adults (over 18)  .166**      (.085) .228**    (.086)  .205**     (.085)  
Size of municipio  in km2  . 001        (.001)  .001       (.001)   -.001        (.001)  
% Educational att. gap  .159***    (.055) .298**    (.057)  .122**      (.057)  
Marginality    7.00***    (1.19)  7.33*** (1.19)   7.93**     (1.24)  
Human Development Index 46.20***   (12.23) 47.53*** (12.15)   51.19*     (12.14)  
Social Development Index 40.74***  (8.83) 40.56*** (8.81)   38.86***  (8.83)  
Crime Frequency  -.001       (.002) -.002     (.002)  -.001          (.002)  
Border States    1.78         (1.16)  1.08        (1.16)   1.13          (1.16)  
Remittances X Ed. gap    -.003       (.014)     
USA X Ed. gap      .019       (.013)     
Return X Ed. gap     -.155*** (.045)     
Marginality X Remittances          -.202*    (.112)  
Marginality X USA            .292*** (.101) 
Marginality X Return           -1.11*** (.347) 
Constant   15.78   8.13      15.25   
R2     0.1120   0.1223      0.1254   
Observations    2028    2028      2028   
    
Dependent Variable: Participation in elections for Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de 
Diputados) 
All F Prob= 0.0000    
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p <.10* 
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This result is consistent with Levitt’s social remittances theoretical underpinnings, but the 
point goes beyond that.  As we contrast this with the previous finding for local participation, 
what we have is individuals returning who opt to exit out of local electoral politics, but who find 
it important to participate in national elections.  The marginality interaction adds to this insight.  
 
 
  
Figure 8. Impact of Migrants on National Participation (Interaction with Ed. Gap) 
All coefficients significant to the .10 level 
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Figure 9. Impact of Migrants on National Participation (Interaction with Marginality) 
All coefficients significant to the .10 level 
 
The pattern here is similar with generally positive results.  First, remittances are 
associated with higher turnout, as much as 0.7% at the lowest levels of marginality, and then 
decline rapidly and become insignificant at the point where marginality hits a medium point.  
The Households with U.S. connection maintain their pattern of initial negative turnout, but after 
some insignificance in the relatively high level of marginality, a positive effect emerges reaching 
as much as 0.8% at the very highest levels of poverty.  Just as important, return migrants echo 
the previous pattern where better off areas seem to be sensitive to potential influence, and have 
an initial 2.5% boost in participation.  Still, they are not impervious to the problems of 
impoverished areas, and at highest levels of marginality, bring about a 3% decline in voting. 
On the other hand, if we explore the predicted probabilities for this table, we find that the 
results also resemble earlier results for remittances, but not for return migrants.  Once more, the 
higher percentage of households that receive remittances is associated with additional voting 
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turnout, but so are return migrants.  In fact, in examining the predictive probabilities one finds 
that increasing the percentage of return migrants increases the likelihood of voter turnout more 
dramatically than do remittances. On the other hand, having more individuals in the United 
States does not make much of a difference, as the interaction proves insignificant, and thus the 
predicted probabilities are not reported.  
 
Table 13. Predicted Probabilities for Participation at the National Level 
 
 
 
Model Variable Mean 1% 5% 10%  
 
2.  All variables at their mean 42.6  
Interaction 
Educ.  % of  Households Remittances  39.3 41.6 44.4 
Gap 
 % of  Households Return  42.5 47.4 53.8 
 
3.   All variables at their mean 42.6 
Interaction 
Marginality % of Households Remittances  41.3 42.2 43.3 
 
 % of Households USA  42.8 42.8 41.5 
 
 
Analogous to this discussion is the third model, where the interaction for remittances and 
marginality shows a similar outline to that observed at the local level.  Remittances prove 
significant and contribute to increased participation.  Having household members abroad does 
initially lead to some added participation, but then falls flat and eventually grows smaller.  
Finally, the interaction with return migrants and marginality does not appear significant at the 
national level.  Thus, the models suggest that return migrants matter more in municipios with 
acute education gaps, rather than in underprivileged areas. 
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Let us now consider the following table, which looks at the likelihood that an incumbent 
party will retain office in the next election. Here, three models were included, one as a simple 
regression with no interactions, and two with various interactions.  First, let us introduce an 
additional interaction measure.  Given some of the negative results, a more systematic way to 
unearth whether these findings have more to do with faulty data than with an accurate reading of 
reality, is to interact the migrant measures with each other.  Combining the figures in this way, 
would be able to create a more precise estimate of the total impact of migrant influence. 
The first regression shows that remittances do increase the likelihood that an incumbent party 
will retain office.  This has to do with the more recent institutional nature of remittances.  The 
Mexican government has actively tried to lure more remittances to the country, particularly those 
that might finance public works. To do this they have instituted a system of collective 
remittances where known as the 3 for 1 program, where for every one dollar sent to the town, the 
state and the federal government would contribute $2 additional dollars. This has a dramatic 
impact on the budget of any municipio, and if done adroitly, the residents would credit both 
migrants and the local county executive.  A good relationship between the two would lead to at 
least some support from abroad, and thus it would increase the likelihood of an incumbent party 
retaining office. 
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Table 14. Impact of Migrants on Incumbent Party’s Chances for Reelection, Logit Model 
 
 
Variable   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
  
 
Households      .000       (.000)    .001        (.001)   .001     (.001)     
Households (Remittances) .043*** (.015) .077*** (.025)  .222     (.248)  
Households (USA)  -.007      (.016)   .011      (.018)  -.452*  (.245)   
Households (Return)  -.047      (.051)    -.250**  (.112)  .170      (.770)   
% Female pop.  -.104**  (.049) -.124**  (.050) -.105** (.049)     
% Indigenous household .002      (.003)    .003      (.003)    .003     (.003)  
% Catholics pop.   -.014**  (.005)  -.014**  (.005) -.014**  (.005)  
% Employed     -.031**  (.014)   -.031**  (.014)   -.027**  (.014)    
% Adults (over 18)  .019       (.017)  .016      (.018)    .013   (.018)    
Size of municipio  in km2 .000    (.001) .000    (.001) .000    (.001)  
% Educational Att. gap  -.049*** (.011)  -.048*** (.011)   -.059*** (.011)   
Marginality   .150       (.246)  .126       (.247)  .148       (.246)  
Human Development Index -.447        (2.30) -.639        (2.32)  .148    (2.30)  
Social Development Index -1.64        (1.88) -1.39        (1.89) -1.46    (1.88)  
Crime    .001         (.001)  .001     (.001) -.001      (.001) 
Border States   .838***   (.185)  .850***  (.186)  .810**   (.187)  
Remittances X Return      -.001**  (.001)      
Remittances X USA      .002    (.001)      
Return X USA      .010       (.007)     
Marginality X Remittances        -.002    (.003)  
Marginality X USA          .005*   (.003)  
Marginality X Return          .001   (.008)   
Constant   11.02**  12.12***  11.94***   
Pseudo R2    0.0380   0.0404   0.0408   
   
Dependent Variable: Incumbent retains office 
Number of observations = 1826 
All Prob χ2= 0.0000 
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p <.10 
  
To examine this more closely, it is again necessary to explore the interaction terms.  First, 
we can look at the migrant measure interactions.  As the reader will notice, this interaction 
exhibits parallel results.  First, in a combination with the other figures, remittances do have a 
positive impact on an incumbent party’s chances, but only to the 25% level or so.  This means 
that for each additional unit of remittances, an incumbent party will maintain an advantage as 
long as the combined level of return migrants and households with individuals in the US remains 
below the 25%.   The U.S. variable turned out insignificant, but the return migrant figure shows 
an opposite result as long as the combined migrant measures stay below 15%. 
 
   
Figure 10. Impact of Migrants on Likelihood of Incumbent’s Reelection (Migrant Measures Interaction) 
All coefficients significant to the .10 level 
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This suggests that return migrants are, in fact, judging the work of the incumbent party on a 
different dimension than those that have stayed behind. A higher level of reelection for 
municipios with higher remittances, on the other hand, could be that individuals credit the mayor 
with some of those very funds.   This is further corroborated by a marginality interaction (not 
reported), where a higher level of marginality is also associated with reelection, and also an 
education gap interaction which displays that the higher the level of households with people 
leaving for the US the more likely the incumbent party will be voted out of office.    
The predicted probabilities add to this story.  In the initial model we find that households 
level of remittances are more likely to retain the incumbent party in office, but the other two 
independent variables of interest prove insignificant.  One of the reasons behind this, given the 
constraints on reelection and the relatively short term, could be that voters feel the best option is 
to expand the party’s time in power.   
The second model aimed at capturing the combined effects of our independent variables 
of interest.  The results substantiate prior findings.  For instance, a relatively equal amount of 
remittances with individuals abroad has an initial effect on voting out the incumbents, but as the 
percentage of households receiving money grow, the likelihood that the incumbent party will 
remain in office grows.  This echoes our suspicions that as migrants have an ever larger amount 
of households to influence, their political sway lessens.  The inverse relationship is also true, but 
insignificant.  Likewise, having a raise in the number of return migrants while holding 
remittances and migrants abroad constant, has a negative relationship with party incumbents.  In 
other words, municipios with a larger amount of return migrants are more likely to vote 
incumbents out.   
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In the third model, once interacted with a education gap, we find that remittances does 
boost the likelihood that the incumbent will remain in office, but only where the lack of 
education is most pronounced.  That is, the interaction proves significant when remittances 
remain constant, and the education gap varies, but not vice-versa.  This, in effect, means that a 
mere higher level of remittances in the municipio will not translate to the incumbent party 
retaining local power, despite the numbers in the predicted probabilities.  The inverse 
relationship is present with return migrants, where their impact on the likelihood of a party 
staying in power is higher in places with low education, but merely augmenting their numbers 
does not suffice.  Nevertheless, the predicted variables reported below do have some interesting 
points.  Notice in particular the dramatic reduction in party incumbency when the number of 
return migrants goes up in the second model. 
 
Table 15. Predicted Probabilities for an Incumbent Party Retaining Office 
 
 
 
Model Variable Mean 1% 5% 10%  
 
2.  All variables at their mean 42.3  
Interaction 
Remittances % of  Households Remittances  31.80 38.81 48.33 
 
% of  Households USA  40.89 41.92 43.24 
 
% of  Households Return  43.82 22.86 10.06  
 
3.  All variables at their mean 42.3 
Interaction  
Educ. Gap % of Households Remittances  23.2 33.23 58.06 
 
 % of Households USA  85.10 59.00 15.26 
 
 % of Households Return  43.32 38.68 39.11 
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Contrast this with the results for the following table, a model with various logit 
regressions examining whether or not voters in areas with high migrant influence will vote for 
parties in the governor’s coalition. To remind the reader, this point is tested because we 
hypothesized at the outsets that return migrants will judge differently given their lack of 
familiarity with the potential local work of the governor’s coalition.  
 
Table 16. Impact of Migrants on Governor’s Coalitions’ Fortunes at the Local Level, OLS model 
 
Variable     Model 1    Model 2   
   
 
Households        .001     (.001)     .001        (.001)  
Households (Remittances)   -.026    (.017)   -.093***  (.030)           
Households (USA)     .006     (.017)    .020         (.019)      
Households (Return)    .006     (.060)   .013        (.127)      
% Female pop.    .063   (.054)   .061       (.053)   
% Indigenous pop.      -.005     (.004)   -.006        (.004)   
% Catholics pop.     .010     (.007)   .012     (.007)   
% Employed       -.012   (.016)   -.013       (.016)     
% Adults (over 18)    -.022     (.020)   -.025     (.020)  
Size of municipio  in km2   .001*** (.000)  .001**     (.000)   
% Educational Attainment gap   .003      (.012)   .009     (.011)    
Marginality       .064     (.285)   .021         (.271) 
Human Development Index    .833      (2.58)   1.43     (2.60)   
Social Development Index    -1.00   (2.04)   -.812     (2.03)      
Border States      .675*** (.200)  .636**     (.199) 
Crime      .001   (.001)   -.001        (.001)   
Remittances X USA    .002*      (.001) 
Remittances X Return    .005**    (.002)  
Return X USA    -.011      (.008) 
Marginality X Remittances       -.014     (.024) 
Marginality X USA         -.031     (.023)  
Marginality X Return         .193**     (.081)  
Constant     -2.88    -3.39    
Pseudo R2     0.0237     0.0282    
Observations     1459    1459    
  
Dependent Variable: Govenor’s Coalition  
All F Prob= 0.0000    
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p<.10  
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Let us analyze the various interaction levels.  As the graphs reveal below, the interaction 
of the migrant measures shows a negative coefficient for both remittances and return migrants.  
In the case of the latter, return migrants have not only a distinct set of issues by which they 
measure the incumbent party, but they might not recognize that the party in charge is one that 
belonged to the Governor.  The difference is that the remittance figure appears significant only at 
the initial levels where the combined impact of return migrants and households with people in 
the US surpass the 8% level, while the return migrants variable shows up as significant well into 
the 50% level.  This means that although one might expect a popular governor to win more 
municipios halfway through their tenure, the impact of migrants would yield the exact opposite.  
For example, in one of the highest migrant states in the country, Zacatecas, the popularity of its 
governor  Amalia Garcia elected in 2004, did little to keep many municipios in the 2007 cycle.  
In fact, the PRD went from 29 county executives to 18, more than a third loss. 
This becomes evident on figures 11 and 12, where the latter also shows that return 
migrants will diminish the chances of a member of the governor’s coalition to be reelected, 
although not so for the U.S. 
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Figure 11. Impact of Migrants on the Governor’s Coalitions’ Reelection Chances (Marginality) 
All coefficients significant to the .10 level 
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Figure 12. Impact of Migrants on the Governor’s Coalitions’ Chances (Marginality) 
All coefficients significant to the .10 level 
 
Something similar appears on the predicted probability tables reported below.  For 
instance, in the first model dealing with encompassing marginality interactions, municipios with 
a higher number of return migrants are actually more likely to vote for parties in the governor’s 
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coalition.  The other two figures prove insignificant.  Elsewhere, the other two models prove the 
importance of remittances as political factors.  Both suggest that as remittances grow and the 
other two numbers remain constant, voters’ preferences move beyond those parties within the 
governor’s coalition.  This suggests two interesting points not originally considered.  First, while 
return migrants do not act as hypothesized at the outset, they do, in fact, alter political outcomes 
in their home country.  This is an important finding, regardless of the theoretical underpinnings.  
Second, remittances can act as more than mere social network proxys, but suggest that money 
alters what voters consider.  In sum, when remittances bring in additional income to a given 
municipio, the governor’s efforts might not be as noticeable, or even as desirable.  The predicted 
probabilities further illustrate this for all three different models in the table.  
 
Table 17. Predicted Probabilities for the Likelihood a Member of the Governor’s Coalition Will Keep Office 
 
 
 
Model Variable Mean 1% 5% 10%  
 
 
1.  All variables at their mean 50.6  
 
% of  Households Return  50.51 50.59 51.52  
 
 
2.  All variables at their mean 50.6  
 
% of  Households Remittances  65.10 56.61 45.32 
 
 
The next results to be examined relate to the level of electoral competitiveness at the 
local and national level. First, let us take note of the competition dynamics in presidente 
municipal races.  The initial tables have suggested that migrants do have an impact on the 
fortunes of specific parties.  An increased turnout, for example, might make an otherwise 
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comfortable victory, a race that becomes more than a foregone conclusion.  This is important 
because as remarked earlier, an increase in competition can make institutions more responsive to 
their constituents.  Given the institutional nature of Mexican politics where no reelection is 
allowed, and where politicians owe their election largely to party bosses rather than constituents, 
an added amount of competition at the local level could have important repercussions. 
This very characteristic appears in the opening statistical model of table 18, as it shows 
that two of our independent variables of interest prove significant.  To wit, having an additional 
amount of remittances or return migrants result in more competitive local elections.  In fact, for 
every additional percentage of households with return migrants in the municipio an equivalent 
0.8% gets deducted from the voting difference between the winning candidate and the runners-
up, while the comparable figure for households with remittances is nearly a 0.3%.  Hence, 
migrants not only lead to more electoral competition, but also can tilt elections in closely fought 
elections at the local level.  Still, the consequence of this finding goes beyond the migrant’s 
ability to actually tip elections to a competing party.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  82
  
Table 18. Impact of Mexican Migrants on Competitiveness at the Local Level, OLS model 
 
 
Variable   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
    
Households      -.001*** (.001)    .001***  (.001)   .001***  (.001)     
Households (Remittances) -.284***  (.096) -.532*** (.163) -.374*** (.094) 
Households (USA)  .071        (.101)  .072       (.114)  .208**     (.099)   
Households (Return)  -.808**    (.322)  1.14       (.707)    -1.34***  (.315)    
% Female pop.  .812***   (.269)  1.06*** (.270)   .705***  (.269)   % 
Indigenous household  -.045**    (.019) -.048**   (.020)  -.066***  (.022)   
% Catholics pop.   .030         (.036)     .025        (.037) .042         (.036)  
% Employed     -.007      (.087) -.004        (.086) -.134        (.088)    
% Adults (over 18)  -.160        (.103) -.112     (.105) -.093        (.102)  
Size of municipio  in km2  -.001     (.001) -.001     (.001) -.001        (.001) 
% Educational Att.  Gap -.290*** (.068)    -.296**    (.069) -.408***  (.070)  
Marginality   -5.06***  (1.55)  -4.83***  (1.55) -2.04***  (1.60)  
Human Development Index -75.5*** (14.25)   -74.6***  (14.20) -65.8***  (14.07) 
Social Development Index 12.77       (11.80) 9.70     (11.76)  7.84         (11.6) 
Crime Frequency   -.001     (.003) .002     (.003) -.002         (.003)  
Border States   -12.9***  (.947) -13.0***  (.949) -13.4***   (.046)  
Remittances X USA     .014      (.009)     
Remittances X Return     -.005***  (.001)    
Return X USA      -.079*     (.042)    
Marginality X Remittances        -.024        (.133) 
Marginality X USA         -123         (.116) 
Marginality X Return        -1.77***   (.412) 
Constant   61.86***  48.69**  72.79***   
 R2     0.1784    0.1875   0.2023   
Observations   1810   1810   1810  
   
Dependent Variable: Level of competitiveness at the local level  
All F Prob= 0.0000    
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p <.10 
 
 
Even in elections where their numbers do not suffice, or where margins of victory 
diminish only slightly, political parties must take these new demands into account if they want to 
assure future success.  Elsewhere, the interactions present in the regressions also paint an 
interesting picture.  First, in our conditional coefficients for the migrant measure interactions we 
find that all three of the independent variables of interest are associated with more competitive 
local elections.  The least effective, the number of remittances subtracts only tenths of a percent 
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to the margin of victory.  The other two, however, have a steeper effect.  An additional  unit of 
households with members in the U.S., for instance, when combined with the other two migrant 
measures adds nearly a percentage point once the migrants’ figures reach 12%, and at its 
maximum, it can moderate the margin of victory by roughly 3.5%.  Similarly, the figure for 
return migrants does not prove significant before the 20% level, but if it reaches similar levels of 
voter participation subtracting slightly over %3 at the mean of the migrant measures. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Impact of Migrants on Electoral Competitiveness at the Local Level (Interaction with Migrant 
Measures) 
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Figure 14. Impact of Migrants on Electoral Competitiveness at the Local Level (Interaction with 
Marginality) 
 
Meanwhile, the marginality interaction tells a more complicated story.   The remittance 
variable does show that elections become more competitive at all levels of marginality, although 
it tapers off as the latter expands.  Still, even in the poorest of places an additional unit of 
remittances, leads to an important decrease of 2.6% points to the margin of victory. While the 
US variable shows a larger margin of victory at a medium level of marginality, return migrants 
clearly show that as marginality increases the opposite happens to the electoral margin of 
victory.  Large parts of Mexico fit this description, as more migrants return to Mexico given the 
present downturn in the economy, and the new immigration tactics, a boost in the level of 
competitiveness could be felt in large parts of the country.   
Return migrants, then, seem to act as an important counterweight in local politics.  So far 
we have found that in a grouping with medium marginality they boost voter turnout, they matter 
for the incumbent party’s fortunes—whether or not they are part of the governor’s coalition. 
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Still, a potential criticism of these observations is that competition at the local level has 
something to do with the precise availability of candidates. That is, the reason why migrants 
have any influence lies not in some alternative political socialization as a result of the migration 
experience, but rather, derives from the wide variance in quality of candidates across municipios. 
It could be, for instance, that migrants matter because the places where they are plentiful, either 
lack quality candidates because they are all abroad, or that they enjoy a better-than-average 
grouping of aspirants because of the region’s connection to the outside world. Therefore, it could 
be argued that local level races were competitive either because voters’ choices were limited to 
weak contenders, or because the candidates were so exceptional, it was difficult to select among 
them. All of which happened to be correlated with places with higher than normal return 
migrants.  In order to address this criticism, we should look at races where the candidates remain 
constant and then across all municipios, which is what the next table addresses. 
Contrast the results in table 19 with those at the local level. In this case, we find that 
migrants’ influence does not come through in the models with each of the variables taken into 
account separately. Once we consider the interaction between the migrant variables, we uncover 
dynamics comparable to those observed at the local level, but only for these, and not for those 
related to marginality or education gap—the latter not reported.  The migrant measure 
interaction, however, does support our hypothesis and the telling of our story.  Specifically, we 
find that when the variable for migrants in the US is combined with the other two, at its mean it 
can lower a 0.03% from the margin of victory, but as this amount swells the figure grows 
rapidly.  That is, it can erase as much as 4% from the margin of victory at its maximum existing 
point.  Likewise, return migrants do prove significant, and where the other two migrant measures 
reach 50% or more, it translates to a 3% to 4% more competitive election at the national level.   
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Table 19. Impact of Migrants on Level of Competition at the National Level, OLS model 
 
 
Variable   Model 1  Model 2   Model 3 
    
Households      .001      (.001)    .001     (.001)   .001       (.001)     
Households (Remittances) -.091  (.078)  -.089  (.134)  -.098   (.080)  
Households (USA)  .108      (.086)   .202** (.091)    .111       (.085) 
Households (Return)  .148     (.256)   .781     (.499)   .145   (.256)   
% Female pop.  1.48*** (.256)  1.35*** (.252)   1.47*** (.254)     
% Indigenous pop.  -.002     (.014)  -.001     (.014)    -.002      (.014)  
% Catholics pop.   .005      (.032)  -.004  (.031)   .005       (.031)  
% Employed      .109   (.071)   .097    (.072)  .102     (.072)   
% Adults (over 18)  -.071     (.093)  -.054   (.094)  -.070    (.093)  
Size of municipio  in km2 . 001**   (.001)  . 001**    (.001) -.001**   (.001)  
% Educational Att. Gap .211*** (.060)  -.224*** (.060) .215***   (.062) 
Marginality   -2.02     (1.35)    -1.82    (1.34) -1.93     (1.42)  
Human Development  Index -24.6*   (14.2)  -27.02** (14.0) -23.53*    (14.1)  
Social Development Index -20.2** (9.91)  -18.20*   (9.57) -20.52**  (10.07)  
Crime Frequency  -.001     (.002)  -.001       (.002) -.001        (.002) 
Border States   4.52*** (.961) 4.06***   (.963) 4.35**     (.961)  
Remittances X Return     .002***  (.001)     
Remittances X USA     .002    (.008)    
Return X USA     -.078*** (.030)    
Marginality X Remittances       -.067      (.118) 
Marginality X USA        .079        (.119) 
Marginality X Return        -.108      (.316) 
Constant   -13.88   -6.45   -13.25   
 R2     0.0606    0.0690   0.0609   
Observations   2028   2028   2028  
   
Dependent Variable: Level of competitiveness at the National Level 
All F Prob= 0.0000    
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p <.10 
 
This again suggests that a permanent increase in the level of return migrants could also 
do much to augment the electoral competitiveness of the country.  Before moving on, an 
important remark is to remind the reader that this level of competitiveness is measured at the 
municipio level.   Consequently, despite what might appear as a low percentage it might have 
quite an impact nationally if this occurred in enough municipios. This is particularly true given 
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the dynamics of the 2006 election, whose numbers are used here. After all, less than half a 
percentage point decided that contest, leading to the general contested nature of the result, and to 
the creation of a parallel government that López Obrador baptized as the “legitimate 
government.” 
The other side of this phenomenon is the performance of third parties. As mentioned at 
the outset, despite the fact that the Mexican party system features three major parties at the 
national level, the sub-national elections act as a de-facto two party system. This is because 
given the first past the post electoral rules two frontrunners characterize the majority of local 
contests with additional parties often attaining a paltry fifteen percent of the vote or less. For 
instance, in Jalisco, where the PAN (National Action Party) and the PRI (Revolutionary 
Institutional Party) dominate state politics, the PRD (Revolutionary Democratic Party) managed 
to win a mere five out of 124 municipal contests in the 2003 election, and even in those cases, a 
majority turned into bipartisan affairs, given that in three of them, the two top vote getters 
obtained slightly over 75% of the vote on average, and no other party averaged more than 12%.14  
Elsewhere, in Zacatecas, where the PRD and the PRI tend to dominate state politics, the PAN 
won a measly six out of 57 electoral races, with only half won by more than five percentage 
points.  Hence, it is worth exploring the way in which migrants are contributing to more 
competitive elections. Have they shifted the vote away from one dominant party and 
concentrated it on one of the other two major parties? Or have they shifted the vote away from 
the top two political actors into alternative parties? If the former is true, electoral 
                                                 
14 Although not an exact description, one could say that sub-national politics are a contest between the PAN and the 
PRI in the North (with the exception of Zacatecas where it is between the PRD and the PRI) and between the PRD 
and the PRI in the South (albeit not in Yucatán, where it is between the PAN and the PRI). No state presents a 
dynamic where the two major forces in the state are the PAN and the PRD, although the Federal District seems to be 
moving in that direction. If anything, though, the DF is dominated by a single party, the PRD, rather than a two or 
three way contest. 
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competitiveness might not prove as efficient in consolidating true accountability. If the latter is 
true, then migrants are in effect contributing significantly to alter the power underpinnings of the 
country. 
One way to investigate this is to run a statistical model using the aggregated voter 
percentage obtained by third parties as the dependent variable, which is what table 20 does for 
us.   As has been the case in previous regressions, the original model does not prove significant 
for any of the independent variables of interest.  The interaction models, however, do have some 
support for our hypotheses.  The first one to explore is the migrant figures. Here, the reader 
might detect that an increase in remittances volume does lead to an increase of the vote share for 
the third parties, but it is minimal and does not prove significant for very long.  This is because at 
the minimum level of 0.1% increase in the migrant U.S. and return measures, the equivalent 
impact was a 0.02% in third party vote share, but it dwindles quickly and its maximum is a mere 
0.1% third party vote share when the 7.5% combined level for migrant measures is reached. 
Elsewhere, consider the households in the US figure.  At the relatively modest initial 
boost combination of remittances and return figures, it would yield a 0.2%, but it would continue 
escalating, leading to nearly 3% difference for third parties at the local level.  Return migrants 
did not prove significant, but an interesting pattern comes from the next interaction in the model, 
where marginality is taken into consideration.  The first two measures are non-significant, but 
return migrants provide an enormous boost to third parties chances at the local level where 
marginality is very high.  As the graph shows, in better off places, third parties do not enjoy 
much added support from migrants, but in more impoverished places, they can reach nearly 1% 
added to their vote share for each additional % of return migrants. 
. 
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Table 20. Impact of Migrants on Third Party Power at the Local Level, OLS model 
 
Variable   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  
Households       .001*   (.001)    -.001**  (.001) .001**   (.001)     
Households (Remittances) .055      (.075)  .250*      (.134)  .039      (.079)  
Households (USA)  .007      (.079)     .033       (.091)  -.008   (.081)   
Households (Return)  -.030    (.244)  -.993*     (.599)   .166   (.245)  
% Female pop.  -.059    (.283)   -.074**   (.284)  -.010** (.281) 
% Indigenous household  .002     (.015)    .003        (.015) .003   (.015)  
% Catholics pop.   -.032    (.029)    -.033     (.030) -.032      (.029) 
% Employed     -.044   (.083)  -.035      (.083)  -.016     (.085)   
% Adults (over 18)  .257**  (.102)    -.247**    (.103) .247**   (.102)  
Size of municipio  in km2 -. 001** (.001)  .001         (.001) -.001   (.001)  
% Educational Att. gap -.072      (.057)  -.064        (.057)    -.050   (.059)  
Marginality    .952      (1.29)   .856     (1.29)  .604      (1.33)  
Human Development  Index -3.22     (12.4)   -5.50    (12.5) -6.09     (12.3)   
Social Development Index -8.10   (9.91)  -6.35    (9.92)   -6.85   (10.0)  
Border States    8.32*** (1.26) 8.41***   (1.27)   8.63** (1.26)       
Crime    -.005*   (.003)  -.005*      (.003) -.005*    (.003) 
Remittances X Return      .001     (.001)   
Remittances X USA     -.014*     (.007)     
Return X USA      .057*     (.032)     
Marginality X Remittances       -.028   (.126) 
Marginality X USA           -.069   (.126) 
Marginality X Return           .785** (.355) 
Constant   -15.95   16.65   -15.62   
 R2     0.0763    0.0785   0.0791   
Observations   1818   1818   1818  
   
Dependent Variable: Vote percentage for third parties local level  
All F Prob= 0.0000    
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Thus, once again, just as they did much to raise the level of participation, and make elections 
more competitive, return migrants also bettered the chances of third parties, as can be observed 
from the interaction graphs reported below.  
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Figure 15. Impact of Migrants on Third Party Share of the Vote at the Local Level (Interaction with 
Migrant Measures)  
All coefficients significant to the .10 level 
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Figure 16. Impact of Migrants on Third Party Share of the Vote at the Local Level (Interaction with 
Marginality) 
All coefficients significant to the .10 level 
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Hence, this table puts forth evidence where return migrants are making electoral races far more 
competitive by supporting third parties. Another way to explore this information is to look at the 
predicted probabilities for this regression.  The results are reported below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 21. Predicted Probabilities for Third Party Power at the Local Level 
 
 
 
Model Variable Mean 1% 5% 10%  
 
2.  All variables at their mean 11.61  
Interaction 
Migrant  % of  Households Remittances  10.08 11.15 12.43 
Figures 
 % of  Households USA  11.41 11.55 11.74 
 
 
3.  All variables at their mean 11.61  
Interaction 
Marginality  % of  Households Remittances  11.39 11.55 11.75 
 
 % of  Households USA  11.67 11.64 11.59 
 
 % of  Households Return  11.58 12.23 13.04 
 
 
From the predicted probabilities we see that return migrants do boost voting percentages 
significantly, particularly when the interaction with marginality is considered. The question to 
consider now is whether or not this pattern holds true in national elections? The answer can be 
observed on the subsequent table, which displays identical statistical models with and without 
interactions. 
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Table 22. Impact of Migrants on Third Party Power at the National Level 
 
Variable   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
    
Households      .001         (.001)    -.001      (.001) -.001      (.001)      
Households (Remittances) -.219***  (.056) -.297*** (.098) -.267*** (.061)   
Households (USA)   .140***  (.054)    .127**   (.062)    .202***  (.055) 
Households (Return)   -.143       (.175)   .232       (.439)  -.139      (.173)  
% Female pop.   .416***   (.159) .466***  (.158)   .376**     (.158)  
% Indigenous household   -.047*** (.010)  -.046*** (.010)  -.050***  (.010)  
% Catholics pop.   .108***     (.021) .107***   (.021) .110***   (.021) 
% Employed      .076        (.050) .076      (.050)  .043        (.050)   
% Adults (over 18)  -.281***   (.058) -.268***  (.059) -.252***  (.058)  
 Size of municipio  in km2 -. 001       (.001) .001     (.001) .001         (.001)  
% Educational Att. gap  .081**      (.035)  .077**    (.035) .037     (.036)  
Marginality    -.366        (.808) -.387     (.807)  .677        (.833) 
Human Development  Index 10.9         (8.13)   12.4       (8.15) 15.1*       (8.19) 
Social Development Index 6.78       (5.85)   4.70     (5.85)   3.67        (5.89) 
Border States   .189       (.628) .227     (.633)   .173      (.634)      
Crime    .001       (.001) .001     (.001)  .001         (.001) 
Remittances X Return     -.004     (.005)     
Remittances X USA     -.001**   (.001)     
Return X USA     -.004     (.025)     
Marginality X Remittances         -.059        (.093)  
Marginality X USA             -.069        (.073) 
Marginality X Return            -.207        (.223) 
Constant   -9.88   -12.75*   -6.38  
 R2     0.0823    0.0850    0.0917   
Observations   2028   2028    2028  
   
Dependent Variable: Vote percentage for third parties  
All F Prob= 0.0000    
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < 10 
 
 
In contrast to the previous table, the opening regression exhibits a strong impact on third 
party power at the national level.  Remittances, for example, appear to lower the vote share for 
third parties, while having members in the U.S. improves their electoral fortunes.  The 
independent variables seem to be working at odds with each other.  How can we explain this, 
particularly given the divergent outcome with the local level?  The answer lies in the different 
political arena.  At the national level in the last two or three cycles campaigns have been run 
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almost exclusively on an economic issue agenda.  Thus, in this case, remittances are mitigating 
some of the economic aspects that would otherwise give traction to some of these municipios.  
 
   
Figure 17. Impact of Migrants on Third Party Share of the Vote at the National Level (Migrant Measures) 
 
   
Figure 18. Impact of Migrants on Third Party Share of the Vote at the National Level (Marginality) 
All figures significant to the .10 level. 
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Once one measures a non-economic aspect of migrant influence, namely individuals 
abroad, the impact on third parties becomes clear, as a positive correlation exists between the 
two.   The interaction models continue to display a contrasting account from that at the local 
level.  The first interaction, for example, that dealing with migrant measures, shows a declining 
vote share for third parties by the remittances variable, although it tapers off as the migrant 
influence continues.   The Households with individuals abroad does increase third party vote 
share, but only at a minimal level and it does not prove significant for very long.  Elsewhere, 
using the marginality interaction we find that remittances lower the third party share of the vote 
as marginality increases, but the US variable has the opposite impact. This is further 
corroborated in the predicted probabilities reported below. 
 
Table 23. Predicted Probabilities for Third Party Power at the National Level 
 
 
Model Variable Mean 1% 5% 10%  
 
2.  All variables at their mean 23.59  
 
% of  Households Remittances  25.27 24.11 22.62 
 
3.  All variables at their mean 23.62  
 
% of  Households Return  23.16 31.51 41.94 
 
 
A final facet of this inquiry deals with the migrants’ impact on the specific fortunes of the three 
major parties. The last table to be discussed, reports whether migrants mattered in the outcome of 
the 2006 election.  The table demonstrates that they played an important role indeed. The 
estimations for the individual parties show a clear pattern. Households that received remittances 
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were more likely to vote in favor of either the PAN or the PRI candidates. The former case, in 
particular, provides compelling evidence for migrants acting as conduits of political values. 
Consider the reasons. As discussed earlier, one could surmise that households receiving 
remittances can be associated with marginality, lower levels of education, and having more need 
for government services.  
 
 
Table 24. Impact of Migrants on Mexican Parties Share of the Vote for the 2006 Election, OLS model 
 
 
Variable   PAN vote  PRD vote  PRI vote  
  
 
Households      -.001    (.001)    .001*      (.001) -.000       (.001)     
Households (Remittances) .221**  (.063)  -.410*** (.093)  .230*** (.080)  
Households (USA)  -.052      (.069)   .046        (.101) -.043       (.086)   
Households (Return)  -.033      (.200)   .524*      (.302) -.405       (.255) 
% Female pop.  -1.08**  (.183) 1.67**    (.276) -.793*** (.247)    
% Indigenous pop.   .010**   (.003)   .002        (.004) -.001       (.016)  
% Catholics pop.   -.233**  (.025) -.138**    (.031) .329***   (.029)  
% Employed     -.100    (.061)  -.361**    (.083)  .417***  (.076)   
% Adults (over 18)  .224**   (.069)  .301**    (.099) -.466**    (.087) 
Size of municipio  in km2 -. 001**  (.001) -.001**    (.001) .001**     (.001)  
% Educational Att. gap .275***  (.044) .675***   (.067) .464***   (.058) 
Marginality    1.52       (1.06) .714     (1.45) -1.56        (1.25)  
Human Development Index 2.02        (10.47)   -23.59    (13.92)  30.99**   (11.87)  
Social Development Index -20.93** (7.80)  -8.51     (10.28)  36.94*** (8.84) 
Crime    .001    (.001) -.002     (.003)  .001         (.002) 
Border States   6.68**    (.712) -13.84**  (.992)  6.41***   (.943)  
Constant   80.87**  -212.2**  -28.39**   
 R2     0.3954    0.2448   0.3180   
Observations   2028   2028   2028  
    
Dependent Variable: voting percentage of the three major Mexican parties in the 2006 
Presidential Election 
All F Prob= 0.0000    
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .10 
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These were precisely the base of the PRI in recent elections, and voters López Obrador—the 
PRD candidate—most tried to appeal to, with plans to radically expand social programs, 
denunciations of the rich, and a clever slogan that cried out that “for the good of all, first the 
poor.” Still, while municipios with high numbers of households receiving remittances proved just 
as likely to vote for the PRI, they voted overwhelmingly against the PRD and also mattered for 
the PAN’s vote percentage. In fact, for every municipio with an additional percent of households 
receiving remittances, López Obrador would lose nearly twice the percentage of votes that the 
PRI and PAN gained. Certainly, the difference of 0.2% seems rather paltry, and perhaps would 
have been irrelevant under normal circumstances. As noted earlier, however, the 2006 Mexican 
presidential election, however, was anything but ordinary. The final IFE tally bestowed the 
presidency to Felipe Calderón with a mere 0.58% vote advantage nationwide. Thus, it is fair to 
say that these households very much played a role in deciding the outcome. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The above discussion paints a rather clear picture. The shift in political attitudes that occurs as a 
result of the migration experience and which migrants subsequently spread either through 
transnational social networks or when they return home has already had an effect on political 
outcomes. Migrants’ renewed interest in politics has augmented participation in some cases.  
This has led to making parties accountable, making it much more complicated to remain in 
office, even when they enjoy the support of the governor. In addition, the local context shapes 
the results that occur, and in locations where marginality is not as pronounced, participation is 
higher.  In contrast, in worse off places, the third party share of the vote improves.   In this way,  
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migrants have begun to further democratize the country turning elections more competitive, 
albeit not always through alternative parties. While this conclusion might certainly be the result 
of the specific elections examined here, the large body of evidence suggests that migrants are 
indeed contributing to the democratization of Mexico, which in turn has occurred due to the 
socialization experienced as a result of migration. 
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4.0  EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF MIGRANTS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
The previous chapters have shown the myriad of ways in which migrants are having an 
impact on the political behavior of their countries of origin.  As promising as these results might 
be, the statistical results are not free of criticism.  The first problem comes from data limitations.  
For one, the two dependent variables of interest in the questionnaire used in chapter three were a 
bit too rigid and as such could not fully capture the dynamic I was interested in, making for what 
could be patchy theoretical links.  Similarly, despite the superior data used in chapter four, the 
numbers only exist for a limited time, and thus could be interpreted as an aberration rather than a 
trend.  The second problem is that the use of statistics can only partially illustrate the underlying 
dynamics, and thus, an important part of the story can be missed.  To address these weaknesses 
in the dissertation, I carried out field work in Mexico. This field work corroborated the statistical 
results and further elucidated the dynamics through which democratic value transference occurs.  
This chapter will detail the ways in which this work was completed, and present its findings. 
The field work consisted of interviews with politicians, diverse community leaders such 
as priests and teachers, return migrants, and business owners in three Mexican states with 
varying degrees of migrant population. The work lasted five weeks in the summer of 2007, with 
an average of three days at each site.  The states in question were Jalisco, Puebla and Zacatecas.  
These were selected for a number of reasons.  First, all had a long tradition of migratory flows, 
thus allowing for comparison overtime, and for circular migrants who had gone to the United 
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States to come back.  Second, immigration studies dealing with all three states already existed 
allowing for additional secondary sources (Garcia Zamora 2003, Rivera Sánchez 2004).  Even 
more importantly, a significant distinction exists between the latter two states that allows for 
some theory testing.  While Zacatecas enjoys a high rate of migrant remittances, a high level of 
transnational migrant organization, and a high level of migrants per capita that encompasses 
almost the entire state, Puebla does not.3  Rather, Puebla has regions within it that exhibit these 
characteristics, but has a more diversified economy and Mexicans living abroad have yet to 
participate in state politics as much as their counterparts in Zacatecas.  In other words, Zacatecas, 
both economically and politically, is more dependant on Mexican immigrants than Puebla is.  
Jalisco is somewhere in between the two, having more municipios than Puebla with high 
concentrations of individuals abroad, but still less than Zacatecas and not enjoying nearly the 
level of transnational migrant organization that Zacatecas enjoys.  Finally, when I carried out the 
field work these states happened to be governed by all three major parties in Mexico.  
Specifically, Jalisco had a PANista (National Action Party) governor, Zacatecas one from the 
PRD (Democratic Revolution Party) and Puebla retained its PRI (Revolutionary Institutional 
Party) allegiance; therefore precluding a faulty conclusion having more to do with local politics 
than with any international dynamics.  Additional information is reported for all three states 
below on table 25. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Zacatecas has been the state where returning migrants have been the most active, both in getting some concessions 
from the state and in fielding candidates who have been Mexican immigrants themselves. 
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Table 25. Descriptive Measures for the States Where Field Work was Carried Out 
 
 
    Puebla   Jalisco   Zacatecas  
 
Area    33,902 Km2             79,082 Km2  73,252 Km2 
 
Population (2005)  5,383,133      6,152,113   1,367, 692   
 
Human Development Index Medium (25th)  High (13th)    Medium (26th) 
 
Largest City   Puebla   Guadalajara  Zacatecas 
   (1,485,941)  (1,579,174)  (122,889) 
 
% Households (Remittances) 3.28%   7.70%   13.03% 
 
% Households (USA)  4.02%   6.53%   12.18% 
 
% Households (Return) 0.66%   1.68%   2.55% 
 
Governor   PRI   PAN   PRD 
 
 
To be able to fully tease out the impact of the two theoretical strands in which I was 
interested—the number of migrants and level of remittances—it was necessary to also find some 
variation within the states.  Thus, I created a simple two by two table that tried to capture the 
interaction between these two strands along with another political variable: the dominance or not 
of the PRI.  I chose this last variable given the long history of domination of this party in 
Mexican politics, and I suspected that in heavily PRIista municipios there might be an 
independent effect that might complicate the potential influence from abroad.  Thus, the actual 
places I visited defined by the two by two table, look like this 
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                                                       Zacatecas (state governed by the PRD) 
PRI 
     Low        High 
 
Pánuco General E. Estrada 
Tlaltenango de 
Sánchez 
Ojocaliente 
Low 
 
Migrants 
Remittances 
High 
 
 
      
      
Puebla  (state governed by the PRI) 
 
PRI 
     Low   High 
    
Domingo Arenas Chiautla de Tapia  
San Diego La Mesa  
Tochimiltzingo 
Atzala  
 Low 
Migrants 
Remittances 
 
High 
 
Jalisco  (state governed by the PAN) 
PRI 
     Low   High 
 
Acatic San Juan de los 
Lagos 
Tepatitlan 
 
Valle de Guadalupe 
     
  Low 
Migrants 
Remittances 
High 
 
 
In order for the reader to get a better sense of the individual characteristics of the place, a 
table is provided with additional descriptive aspects of each of the places visited. 
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Table 26. Important Descriptors of the Municipios Visited 
   
   % Households     %Households     % Households   Marginality 
Remittances  USA  Return 
 
Zacatecas 
Pánuco     4.3          5.3      0.4             Medium 
General Estrada       10.8             9.9                2.0             Low 
Tlaltenango de Sánchez    15.9             15.2     4.3              Low  
Ojocaliente                        12.6             12.1                    3.6              Medium      
Momax        11.9                       12.0     2.9                       Medium 
 
Puebla 
Domingo Arenas       1.6               4.8        0              Medium 
Chiautla de Tapia      22.8  9.32       2.9               Medium  
San Diego La Mesa     11.8       20.6         2.9           High   
Tochimiltzingo 
Atzala        20.5  19.1                      3.8                  High      
Coatzingo       17.9                         5.9         2.0                       High             
 
Jalisco 
Acatic       13.2                15.2                      6.5                      Low  
San Juan de los Lagos     9.5          9.8                       2.5           Low 
Tepatitlán         7.6                             10.0         3.0                      Very Low            
Valle de Guadalupe        10.2        13.4                       4.5                     Low           
Finally, for the reader who might be unfamiliar with the area, a map is provided below. 
 
 
Figure 19. Map of the Mexican States Where Field Work was Carried Out 
The clear areas are the ones visited, each with their respective abbreviations: Jalisco 
(JAL), Zacatecas (ZAC), and Puebla (PUE).  In addition, within each state, the shaded areas are 
the actual municipios visited. 
 
Figure 20. Municipios in Which Field Work was Carried Out, Summer 2007 
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At each location, I tried to interview as many people as possible, although I particularly 
emphasized county executives (presidentes municipales), given both their sense of the political 
pulse of the area, and their first hand knowledge of the level of political organization of migrants.  
I used a general questionnaire at each site, albeit with additional questions depending on the 
place or the flow of the interview.4  In particular, I wanted to know if individuals perceived 
changes in political attitudes of those that had gone and come back, but also tried to get a sense 
of the politics of the sites to see the impact that migrants had in the region. The major findings 
follow.   
4.1 CHANGE IN POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
In general, I found evidence of political attitude change across the states starting in Puebla.  
Located in the central part of the country, with easy access to Mexico City, the pattern of 
migration from Puebla is a relatively recent development, particularly compared to the other two 
states in my sample, Jalisco and Zacatecas.  This leads to a slightly different migrant profile for 
Puebla.  Overall, poblanos tend to be younger, have spent less time abroad, and have lived 
abroad in locations with fewer Mexicans, but more established latin migrants, namely New York, 
New Jersey and other places in the East Coast.  Moreover, unlike Jalisco and Zacatecas with a 
broad pattern of immigration that includes cities and rural areas, poblano migrants tend to come 
                                                 
4 See Appendix for the full questionnaire. 
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from the dry areas of the South and the isolated mountain towns in the North.  All sites I visited 
are located in the Southern part. 
In Chiautla de Tapia, for example, one of the men in the city council explained:  
“ Well, yes.  One immediately realizes that people come back with other ideas, questions 
of hygiene, of sexual protection, for example.  Political concerns, even.” (Chiautla de Tapia, 
Sindico, Interview May 2007). 
 
Elsewhere, in Coatzingo, one of the local teachers suggested a more profound  
impact of migrants, as a result of political attitude change: 
 
“Well, yes. I have definitely noticed differences [since migrants started leaving and 
coming back].  For example, in matters of politics, now even women participate, before, when?”  
(Teacher, Coatzingo, Interview May 2007). 
 
This was also perceived by the return migrants themselves, both young and old, which 
often made the connection between their time in the U.S. and their subsequent political attitudes 
quite explicit.  For example, in San Diego La Mesa, the presidente municipal, a man in his 
forties, considered the impact in his own life: 
“I, frankly, changed a lot. One sees how things are over there [in the U.S.], that 
everything is well-controlled, that they respect the law, that people live well.  It gave me the idea 
that I too could put a little bit of that in Mexico.” (Presidente Municipal, Interview May 2007).  
 
In a different migrant community, another presidente municipal—this one in his 
thirties—echoed the same sentiment when he quipped:  
“Well, yes.  I know that because of the boss I had (in the US) now I am very responsible.  
I know that one has the obligation to be punctual and that one has to work hard.” (Atzala, Puebla. 
Presidente Municipal. Interview May 2007). 
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Meanwhile, younger people, particularly women, noticed differences in attitudes about 
women’s rights and the role of women in general. 
“People are so different here.  They think that just because someone is a woman, one 
can’t do certain things.” (Student who came back from the U.S., Interview May 2007). 
 
Other examples include a hotel owner in Chiautla de Tapia, Puebla, and a taxi driver in 
Atlixco, Puebla, who told me that they had become more awaken to politics because they saw 
just how different things were [in the US]. Specifically, they referred to their jobs, how orderly 
they were, how institutionalized everything was, how responsibility was not taken lightly, the 
owner did not show up late, and one could easily lose their job if they did not do what was 
expected of them.  This was in contrast to their perception that in Mexico, the responsibility 
authorities feel to the people is completely lacking.   
Certainly, time and place seems to be a factor.  Those migrating to places with fewer 
migrants for longer periods of time seem to be more likely to alter their political attitudes.  For 
example, Atzala’s migrants tend to opt for California destinations for shorter periods of time than 
their counterparts in Chiautla de Tapia.  Thus, one was able to see subtle differences in their 
political attitudes.  For example, despite the fact that Atzala is located in a more prosperous 
economic zone, with easier access to the state capital, people were less likely to be hopeful about 
political solutions to their economic problems.  On the other hand, those in Chiautla seemed to 
believe that economic support from their countrymen empowered them to solve their collective 
problems such as the constant threat of drought in the area.  Some former migrants who I spoke 
to in San Diego de la Mesa made this point more overtly, when asked if their trip to the U.S. had 
changed their perception. 
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“No, we came back the same.  But, well, neither did we last very long.  Those that come 
back now…yes they do.  Those, last years, and look at how they come back.  They even run for 
presidente municipal.” (Interview with former migrants, May 2007). 
 
Jalisco and Zacatecas, unlike Puebla, have no particular concentration of sending 
communities.  Rather, migrants come from all corners of the region, and while in decades past 
the traditional destination had been the Southwest, now both states boast migrants in the new 
migrant destinations in the United States including the Midwest and the South.  Furthermore, 
unlike Puebla, migrants from both of these states are more diverse in terms of age and social 
class.  In spite of these differences, a similar pattern of attitude change to that of Puebla surfaced. 
For instance, in Tlaltenango, Zacatecas, the presidente municipal assured me that: 
“Life in the United States is like a school.  Over there, one learns how things should be, 
how the government can really be.  Everything clean and in order.”  (Interview Presidente 
Municipal, Tlaltenango, June 2007). 
 
 More to the point, in the same town, I met a man, currently running for president for a 
tiny political party (Alternativa), who told me that he had lived in the US for 10 years.  He said 
that living in the US gave him a sense of just how immature the political system in Mexico was.  
The problem, as he saw it, was that unlike the US, the government in Mexico can do just fine and 
actually prosper the more unresponsive it is to the majority of the population.  So when he came 
back, he decided to do something about it, not with mere bandages, but actually joining with 
people who had a long term vision.  He wanted to join a political party that was not top-down, 
but bottom up like Alternativa—a tiny political party with about 6% of the presidential vote in 
the past 2006 election.  He also stressed that in becoming the presidente of Alternativa, he 
wanted to contribute from his experience in the US, specifically by promising only viable things.  
In particular, he talked about improving accountability with simple measures: 
  108
  
“Look, here’s a simple thing.  How about actually being at work at a set schedule rather 
than showing up whenever they feel like it in the morning?” (Political candidate of Alternativa, 
Tlaltenango, Interview, May 2007). 
 
 Party or location did not seem to matter much.  Individuals from all walks of life 
told me again and again their perception of how those who come back have changed, which in 
general they find positive.  Another example comes from the county executive’s secretary in 
Ojocaliente, Zacatecas who expressed how ideas propagate within the community: 
“Well, of course, people come back politically changed.  And this spreads within the 
families [of those with connections in the US]. Here, I can tell you that people have supported 
our vision, because people come back more prepared.” (Ojocaliente, Zacatecas, Secretary of the 
Presidente Municipal, interview May 2007). 
 
More broadly speaking, both states showed clear migrant influence in their physical 
appearance.  Southwestern type architecture dotted the migrant regions that I visited in both 
Zacatecas and Jalisco, and more tellingly, places like Tepatitlán and Tlaltenango had actually 
incorporated American style stop signs, along with the associated traffic rules.  While this latter 
point might not seem like much evidence of migrant influence, it actually is.  Stop signs are not 
common anywhere in central Mexico, particularly in rural areas, and yet, this had become then 
norm in these places.  A presidente municipal underlined this connection: 
“People certainly change [in the United States], even in the way they want to see their 
houses.  Have you not seen them?  The come back and want to have a nice house with a garden 
[like in the U.S.].  But of course, well taken care of….Would you believe that even palm trees 
[like in California] are fashionable now?  I have one in my house.” (Interview, Secretary to the 
Presidente Municipal, Tepatitlán, June 2007).  
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4.2 MIGRANTS, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND PARTICIPATION 
More than attitude change, the field work suggested further evidence for the findings in chapter 
three and four, namely that attitude change leads to increased participation.  In communities with 
high migrant population, the consensus seemed to be that individuals participated more in the 
political and social life of their places of origin, at least partly as a result of their migration 
experience.  For example, in Zacatecas, the director of a local middle school explained: 
“People really participate here.  They are always very active in the decision-making.  I 
can also tell you that the migrants have participated economically and have contributed for things 
here at the school.  For example, they were the ones that got us a bus [for the school].” (Director 
of a Middle School, General Estrada, Interview, May 2007). 
 
Elsewhere, another school director echoed the sentiment and attributed directly to  
the migration experience.  As he put it: 
 
“To go [to the United States] gives people more trust in themselves.  A person that has 
the same little education than one that remains here, perhaps will not be able to communicate 
themselves as well in Spanish, but they are not embarrassed, they come and they want to know 
everything.  They want to be active in the school.” (Ojocaliente, Zacatecas, High School 
Director, Interview June 2007). 
 
More than that, he emphasized its benefit, particularly in regards to new policies  
and attributed a specific political outcome to the presence of migrants in the town.  He  
elaborated that the new environmental policies of the PRD were extremely difficult to  
implement in the school because of the idiosyncrasies and cultural practices of the locals,  
but: 
 “The ones that come [from the U.S.].  Those did come and support [our efforts], 
those did participate.  You will not find a greener school anywhere in the region.” (Ojocaliente, 
Zacatecas, Interview, June 2007). 
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This extended to political participation, and this point surfaced over and over again in 
various locations in different guises.  In General Estrada, Zacatecas, for instance, the presidente 
municipal emphasized that in his town: 
“Certainly, people participate [more than in previous years].  That’s become people 
return with a different vision.  They bring new ideas and it’s also so we can [succeed], because 
they love their town [that is why they participate].” (General Estrada, Zacatecas, Interview, June 
2007). 
 
I also found that in general, local authorities seem to be quite concerned about the 
opinion of the individuals abroad.  That is, migrants seem to act as a political counterweight and 
bring at least some accountability.  In Chiautla de Tapia, for example, the PRIista presidente 
municipal elected in 2006 tried to run his administration with a dictatorial manner and with little 
transparency.  As a result, a group of locals took over the presidency for three months until the 
presidente resigned, all the while apparently being supported and cheered on from abroad.  On 
the subject, the new authorities opined: 
“One needs not announce anything.  The ones living here, tell the ones living over there.  
That way, they know we’re working and there’s no problem.” (Sindico, Chiautla de Tapia, 
Interview May 2007). 
 
Concern with migrant’s opinions even makes it to political rallies.  In Tlaltenango, I 
witnessed a local political rally for the PRD—the current party in power.  The candidate, a young 
protégé of the current administration, made his position clear: 
“We want the paisanos that come back to find a Tlaltenango they can be proud of.  We 
want it to be a place they want to come back to, and we are going to work with them to make it 
happen.” (PRD rally, Tlaltenango, June 2007). 
 
Perhaps one of the reasons that explains this is the fact that migrants seem to be less 
partisan than those who never left.  That is, they have certain expectations about the role of 
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government and they do not necessarily associate it with a particular party.  As an example, one 
can cite the politics of General Estrada in Zacatecas.  The municipio like much of the state had 
voted the PRD into power, but the presidente seemed to care more about higher office rather 
than the needs of the town, so in the next election they turned to a migrant, who had a reputation 
of being honest.  As it was explained to me by a former migrant, now a business owner: 
“We do not care about the party.  Independently of political parties, we want to see 
results.  People care about who comes to work, who has the door of the presidency open to shady 
deals.  It is not like before, that we just let things happen.” (General Estrada, Interview, May 
2007). 
 
The theoretical framework I originally designed also included a number of negative 
cases.  That is, I also visited additional sites similar in terms of vicinity and population, but with 
a negligible rate of migration.  The aim was to explore the extent to which political trends were 
associated with migrants, rather than with the country as a whole.  In general, the interviews 
supported the intuition of the project, as no municipio showed similar levels of participation, or 
interest in politics, regardless of party or alternance in power at the local level.  Indeed, locals 
oftentimes did not find voting a useful tool in the improving of their lives.  For instance, in 
Domingo Arenas in Puebla, the local presidente municipal lamented that participation had 
actually dropped in recent times: 
“Well, people might participate, but not like they used to…Particularly in matters of 
community work, when we need economic or political support from people, they do not 
participate.  They think that things will get done even if they do not do anything.” (Domingo 
Arenas, Presidente Municipal, Interview May 2007). 
 
Similarly, individuals did not seem to trust the government much or see the point  
of participating in the political matters of the town.  A business owner put it in rather  
stark terms: 
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“People don’t see about parties.  What for?  They are all the same.  If people participate 
at all in local matters is because they actually know someone, rather than because they think they 
are capable or their lives will change much.” (Domingo Arenas, business owner, Interview May 
2007). 
 
The issue of participation did not seem to be associated with a particular party.  While 
Acatic, a town in Jalisco ruled by the PRI, the participation seemed to be average according to 
many of the individuals who I talked to, Pánuco, Zacatecas, headed by the PRD, the level of 
participation was dismal.  The presidente municipal made this explicit, when he confided his 
frustration with the local lack of interest in politics: 
“Look, let me just tell you.  You are probably well-aware of the committees the state 
government is encouraging for social participation.  Those that try to make the government more 
accountable, increase transparency, right?  Well, in Pánuco, we use five people to form a 
committee, and oftentimes, we can barely get three, not even enough to head a committee, let 
alone one to make a real connection with people.” (Pánuco, Zacatecas, Presidente Municipal, 
Interview June 2007). 
 
Taken together, these interviews strongly suggest that people change as a result of  
the migration experience, which in turn leads to added participation, and at least some  
added accountability. 
 
4.3 MIGRANTS AND LIMITS OF GRASSROOTS CHANGE 
Given this situation, where political actors concur that individuals come back with novel political 
ideas and are prompt to engage the local political scene, why does Mexico seem to be so slow 
transform itself, even at the municipal level?  I gathered a number of clues.  The first problem is 
conflict with those who remain.  While, in general, they have admiration and respect for those 
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who return, towns are not always ready to embrace whatever new ideas migrants might bring.  A 
member of the city council in Chiautla de Tapia, alluded to this when he explicated the reason 
why he had not immediately tried to run for office, or even tried to carry out some of the ideas he 
had for the town: 
“One comes back with lots of ideas, lots of good ideas.  But then, things are not so easy.  
People have to first recognize one.  I first had to have people [come to terms] with me [before I 
could do anything].” (Chiautla de Tapia, Puebla, Regidor, Interview May 2007). 
 
Elsewhere, a priest in Coatzingo, Puebla elaborated on this issue.  As he put it, those left 
behind might have a lot of deference for migrants, but this also has a component of resentment 
and envy.  Added to this the fact that people generally have little education leads to community 
reticence to incorporate new political strategies or ideas.  A taxi driver from San Juan de los 
Lagos echoed this when he noted that individuals might come back with new ideas, often good 
ones, but sometimes, they were “too liberal, and we don’t want those here.” (San Juan de los 
Lagos, Interview June 2007).  More tellingly, Middle school students in San Diego la Mesa—
half of which fully intended to leave the town for the United States as soon as they were 
capable—told me that the reason why life was not improving in their town was because there 
were locals who blocked the progress migrants tried to bring.  According to them, “San Diego 
would be better if everyone would go to the United States and come back.” (San Diego la Mesa, 
Puebla, Interview May 2007).  Certainly, this conflict results in frustration for those intending to 
better their municipios of origin, which either leads to disengaging from political leadership, or 
leave altogether from the area.  The secretary to a local state representative in Puebla, elaborated: 
“The problem is that as soon as they see how difficult it is to change things, they simply 
leave.  You know what they do?  They move to Atlixco.5  Overthere, they find more likeminded 
                                                 
5 Atlixco is a prosperous city.  It is the second largest urban area in the state of Puebla, with relatively easy access to 
the capital of the state and Mexico City. 
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people.  Or at the very least, they don’t have to be worried about the lack of government 
services.” (Izucar de Matamoros, Puebla. Secretary of a State Representative. Interview, May 
2007). 
 
The second problem has to do with government capabilities.  As a sindico (councilman) 
in Puebla articulated: 
“Well, yes, the paisanos come back, and they do bring other ideas, right.  They want to 
fix this and that.  But sometimes this just can’t be done.  Here, there are big needs and few 
resources.” (Chiautla de Tapia, Puebla, Sindico, interview May 2007). 
 
Another problem is institutional.  A very young presidente municipal in Jalisco put it in 
very clear terms: 
“Well, yes, of course, people come back and come with all kinds of ideas.  I’ll give you 
two examples.  As soon as they get here, they want to change our trash services and our traffic 
laws.  They say ‘overthere is like this.  Here, it should be like that too.’  And yes, it is not that I 
do not agree, but it’s just that we do not have the means to put that into practice. The municipio 
here, even if the Constitution says it, it’s not very autonomous.  We do not have the resources to 
simply add resources or expand the landfills.” (Valle de Guadalupe, Jalisco, Presidente 
Municipal, interview June 2007) 
 
Just as importantly, it appears that the places where immigrants hold the potential to have 
the most impact, that is, in small towns around the country, are also the places where they will 
face the most obstacles to do something with their new ideas, namely marginalization, lack of 
overall education, and lack of institutional power at the local level. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter detailed the findings of the field work in Mexico in the summer of 2007.  At the 
heart of the project were two general lines of inquiry established in my theoretical framework, 
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and for which I had already found statistical evidence.   The first line was whether or not 
individuals altered their political attitudes.  The second line was to what extent this 
transformation had an impact on political outcomes.  I hypothesized that one of the consequences 
would be a higher level of participation, and which in turn, the statistics suggested would also 
lead to more political accountability.  Both of these strands received support from the field. 
First, individuals from all walks of life, regardless of the party in office, specific 
economic make up of the region, or isolation from the capital city, informed me again and again 
that the attitudes of migrants do change.  The interviews fleshed out further how this process 
happens, as return migrants explicated that their experience abroad led them at first to be familiar 
with a different way of life, and then to question things at home.  Second, while a bottom-up 
democratization spearheaded by migrants has been surfacing in Mexico, institutional and local 
constraints have slowed the potential to transform the country. That is, the same dynamics that 
made people leave in the first place, are the same ones that prevent people from radically 
converting their local communities. 
 
 
  116
  
5.0  CONCLUSION 
The transnational literature has suggested a link between immigration and democratization, a 
phenomenon that some scholars have termed social remittances.  And yet, it has been slow to 
scrutinize this relationship empirically, mostly because of lack of data and difficulties in 
measuring its potential impact.  This dissertation looked in detail at this question through an 
approach from the political behavior literature.  The argument posited at the outset suggested that 
the immigration experience itself leads to a transformation in political attitudes, which in turn get 
transferred to the countries of origin through social networks and actual political participation 
when immigrants return home.  The former occurred through a number of interrelated 
phenomena, namely access to new ideas about the host country, as well as one’s own, the 
questioning of identity, and novel interactions between individuals and a nation state through the 
form of laws, regulations and general attitudes about government functions.  While a similar 
trend might have transpired in previous immigrant waves, the second part of the argument is 
what has made this phenomenon so much more relevant in the present day.  As discussed at the 
outset, technological advances in transportation and communications have made the transference 
of ideas possible in enough numbers to make a difference in the countries of origin. These 
theoretical claims were tested empirically at both the individual and the aggregate level through 
quantitative and qualitative methods. 
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The second chapter investigated this using survey data from the Mexican Migrant Survey 
in addition to the Latin American Public Opinion Project.  The two surveys were used in an 
effort to connect the dots at both ends of the migration chain, and to address as much as possible 
the potential problem of self-selection bias.  The first survey, carried out entirely in the 
Southwest, permitted some evidence showing that the immigration experience had a definite 
effect on attitudes toward Mexican institutions.  To wit, the statistical models demonstrated that 
the longer one stayed in the United States, the more likely it was that one would find fault with 
the performing of Mexican institutions, and less likely one would feel connection to the PRI.  
The former also held true for those sending money to Mexico.  In this way, the Mexican Migrant 
Survey corroborated the first part of the theoretical argument, that migrants once in the United 
States altered their attitudes about their country of origin.    
The second survey, carried out in seven countries including Mexico, Colombia and 
several in Central America, allowed us to test at the other end of the migration chain.  Mainly, 
the point was to establish whether or not attitudes were actually being transferred. Despite some 
weaknesses having to do with the nature of the questions, the second survey did bear out a 
number of important findings.  The first important finding surfaced in the case of those with 
contact with migrants abroad, as these individuals were more likely to participate and have 
stronger democratic attitudes.  That is, those who received remittances were not only more likely 
to attend political rallies, work for political parties and vote, but also had more tolerance for the 
rights of those they disagreed with politically, including their rights to protest, run for office and 
vote.  The second significant result emerged with those that had actually lived in the United 
States and had returned.  This sample was small and did not fully capture the migrant experience.  
Still, the data suggested that those who had lived abroad were more likely to feel politically 
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efficient, and had far less tolerance of corrupt actions in the government than those who had 
never left.   
The third chapter aimed to examine this connection at the aggregate level.  In particular, 
the question was whether having an effect at the individual level made a difference for political 
outcomes in the country of origin.  To do this, the chapter used data taken from the Mexican 
census that had figures for the percentage of households with members who had returned and for 
those which still had individuals abroad for all of the municipios in the country.  This coupled 
with electoral returns from a number of local and national elections allowed for a wide number 
of dependent variables to be tested.  This examination concentrated on the demand side of the 
political equation.  That is, the chapter considered whether or not municipios with a higher 
percentage of migrants had higher rates of participation at both the local and national levels, 
whether or not the rate of incumbency was lower, whether or not the rate of competitiveness was 
higher, and whether third parties received a higher percentage of the vote.  All of these were 
based on electoral results for elections that happened after 2000, when the migrant figures were 
collected. 
The results were compelling.  On participation, the chapter showed that those municipios 
with a larger number of migrants, both receiving remittances and those that have returned, saw 
the participation level increase, particularly as marginality increased.  This model held for both 
the local and national deputy races with different permutations.  The pattern showed more clearly 
in the latter, suggesting that once abroad individuals follow a similar outline than those of more 
advanced countries, where national elections hold more interest than local races.  This increased 
level of participation makes it harder for incumbent parties to remain in office, allows for more 
competitive races, and even boosts the vote totals of third parties.  In the models exploring the 
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likelihood of incumbent parties retaining office, the chapter found that municipios with a high 
level of remittances were more likely to retain an incumbent, while the municipios with a high 
level of return migrants, were more likely to vote them out.  In other words, the impact of new 
political attitudes is not felt at the local level, until a significant amount of return migrants exists.  
This is again because while abroad, interest in participation is higher in the national races, 
although clearly it shifts once they have returned home.  More elaborate models were run on the 
point of competitiveness.  The results suggested that municipios with higher level of migrants 
abroad and with some consideration of the local context displayed more competitive elections, 
and further investigation looking at third party behavior suggested this occurred through 
individuals coalescing around a single opposition party, not around third parties.  In addition, this 
took place because municipios where marginality did not loom as large a challenge. 
Finally, the models used in this chapter exhibited the influence that migrants had on the 
outcome of the 2006 presidential election.  Specifically, the models showed that municipios that 
received remittances were more likely to vote for the PRI or the PAN, and to actively vote 
against the PRD.  While the former result might not seem surprising to an observer of Mexican 
politics, given that the PRI’s once dominant base has shrunk to poverty stricken areas, both 
results are compelling for two reasons.  First, these were the very voters the PRD standard bearer 
tried to appeal to with his emphasis on poverty reduction and his populist faction.  Second, the 
PAN has traditionally done terribly among poorer voters, and yet, municipios with contacts 
abroad were more likely to vote for the party.  This connects to the influence we outlined in 
chapter three, where we found that the longer individuals have been in the U.S., the closer they 
feel to the PAN, regardless of income, education or gender.   In other words, municipios with 
high migrant contact that one would have expected to vote for López Obrador, opted not to, 
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either with a safer bet, or with a complete change, a particularly important finding given the tiny 
margin by which the 2006 election was decided. 
The fourth chapter considered how this actually played out in the ground.  I traveled to 
twelve municipios in Mexico using various criteria.  First, I selected three states ranging from 
high to low migrants, which happened to be governed by the three major parties in the country.  
That is, I opted to carry out field work in Zacatecas (PRD), Jalisco (PAN) and Puebla (PRI).  In 
addition, within each of the states, I looked for further variation, by creating a two by two matrix 
that combined places with low and high migrants along an important political variable, namely 
the strength the PRI had achieved in the latest election.  I chose this last variable given the long 
history of domination of this party in Mexican politics, and also because I suspected that in 
heavily priista municipios, there might be an independent effect that might complicate the 
potential influence from abroad.  Lastly, I also included two supplementary types of municipios.  
Those with high migrants that enjoyed low remittances, and those with low migrants that 
benefited from a high remittance rate. 
The field work consisted of interviews with politicians, diverse community leaders such 
as priests and teachers, return migrants, and business owners in three Mexican states with 
varying degrees of migrant population, all in Spanish.  In doing so I discovered that migrants 
indeed play a role as conduits of values.  Over and over, in various setting and contrasting 
circumstances, individuals echoed my suspicions.  Migrants bring not only new ideas, but bring a 
fresh perspective and provide at least some accountability to local authorities. Still, powerful 
obstacles remain to a bottom-up change in Mexico, where despite the presence of a new social 
actor, change comes at a very slow pace.  In fact, the very factors that led individuals to opt for 
opportunities abroad are the ones constraining the potential of migrants to transform the 
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communities.  That is, chronic poverty, weak institutions, lack of education, and economic 
stagnation conspire to prevent deep reformation, and yet, that is happening at all, is itself a 
fascinating phenomenon.    
To conclude, this work has shown evidence for a process of political attitude transference 
to the countries of origin.  It proved attitude change among migrants in the United States, and 
attitude transference to the countries of origin at the individual and aggregate level, using both 
quantitative and qualitative level.  This is some of the first concrete evidence to corroborate the 
theoretical idea of social remittances, and it opens up a number of questions worth pursuing.  
Further research is needed to examine statistically whether migrants have an impact on political 
outcomes in other countries in Latin America, or whether this is something unique to the 
Mexican case. Another potential fruitful avenue of investigation is to trace in more detail how 
this occurs, and scrutinize both ends of the migration chain.  Are certain migrants more 
influential in attitude transference than others?  Does regime change matter? What role does the 
host country play? Are certain places in the country of origin more responsive to migrant 
influence? Why?  Finally, this contributes to the ongoing public debate on immigration.  
According to my dissertation, migrants are having an impact not only on the host country, but 
also on the countries of origin, a democratizing one that could have long term consequences. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLES USED FROM THE DIFFERENT SURVEYS (PEW HISPANIC SURVEY 
AND LAPOP) FOR CHAPTER 2 
Variables used from the Pew Hispanic Center Survey of Mexicans Living in the U.S.  
 
Opinion of Mexican Institutions 
In general terms, what is your general opinion of the way Mexican Institutions function?  Would 
you say that they are 5 very good, 4 good, 3 fair, 2 bad, 1 very bad? 
 
Closeness to Mexican Political Parties 
In Mexican politics, which of the following parties, do you feel closest to?  1 PRI 2 PAN 3 PRD 
7 None of the three. 
 
Time Lived in the U.S.    Household income (after taxes) 
0 to 99 (0 being less than a year)   1 Less than $5000 
       2 5,000 but less than 10,000 
US Citizenship     3 10,000 but less than 15,000 
Yes 1         
No 0       Female     
       
Education      0 Man 
What is the last grade in school that you  1 Woman  
completed?            
      Phone Frequency 
1 1 to 8 or no school      
2 High School incomplete    1 Almost never 
3 High School grad     2 Less than once a month 
4 GED       3 Once or twice a month 
5 Business or Vocational School   4 Once a week 
6 Some College, no 4 year degree   5 More than once a week  
7 College Graduate 
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8 Post Graduate Training 
9 Refused 
 
 
Variables used from the Latin American Public Opinion Project. 
 
Independent variables of interest 
Do you receive remittances? 
Yes  1 
No  0 
 
Have you lived in the US in the last three years? 
Yes 1 
No 0 
 
Do you have intention of Leaving the country in the next three years? 
Yes 1 
No 0 
Additive Index for Independent Variables 
Political Participation 
Have you ever asked the President for some aid with a problem? (1-3) 
Have you ever asked a federal deputy for some aid with a problem? (1-3) 
Have you ever asked a local authority for some aid with a problem? (1-3) 
Have you ever protested in a public demonstration? Have you done it sometimes, rarely or 
never? (1-3) 
Have you gone to a political assembly called by the mayor in the last year? 
Have you presented a petition with the local municipio or authority in the past year? 
Did you vote in the past national election? (0-1) 
Did you work for a party or candidate? 
 
 
Institutional Trust 
To what extent do you believe your country’s tribunals guarantee a just trial? (1-7) 
To what extent do you have respect for your country’s institutions? (1-7) 
To what extent do you believe the basic rights of your country’s citizens are protected by your 
country’s political system? (1-7) 
To what extent are you proud to live under your country’s political system? (1-7) 
To what extent do you believe your country’s political system should be supported? (1-7) 
To what extent do you trust the judicial system? (1-7) 
To what extent do you trust the elections? (1-7) 
To what extent do you trust Congress? (1-7) 
To what extent do you trust the National Government? (1-7) 
To what extent do you trust the Police? (1-7) 
To what extent do you trust political parties? (1-7) 
To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court (1-7) 
To what extent do you trust your local authority? (1-7) 
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Horizontal Trust  
Speaking of people living around here.  Would you say that people are: Not trustworthy at all? A 
bit trustworthy? Somewhat trustworthy? Very trustworthy? 
Do you believe people only care about themselves or that they try to help other people most of 
the time?  (0-1) 
Do you believe that if people had the opportunity, would take advantage of you? Or that they 
would not take advantage of you?  (0-1) 
 
Informed 
How often do you….listen to news on the radio? (1-4) 
Watch news on TV? (1-4) 
Read newspapers? (1-4) 
Read news on the internet? (1-4) 
 
 
Community Participation (Social Connectedness) 
Have you donated money or materials in the last year to solve a problem in your community? (0-
1) 
Have you donated your own work? (0-1) 
Have you assisted to a neighborhood meeting to solve a problem or consider an improvement for 
the neighborhood? (0-1) 
Have you tried to organize a meeting to solve a problem or consider an improvement for the 
neighborhood? (0-1) 
Have you tried to organize a group to combat delinquency in your neighborhood? (0-1) 
Do you attend reunions of a religious organization? (1-4) 
Do you attend parent-teacher meetings? (1-4) 
Do you attend reunions of a professional organization? (1-4) 
Do you attend reunions of a trade union? (1-4) 
Do you attend reunions of some civic association? (1-4) 
  
Knowledgeable Voters 
Do you remember what the name of the President of the United States is? (0-1) 
Do you remember how many states/provinces/regions your country has? (0-1) 
How long does the presidential term last in your country? (0-1) 
Do you remember what the name of the Brazilian president is? (0-1) 
 
Political Efficacy 
Do you believe that voting can better the future or do you believe that no matter who you vote 
for, things will not get better? (0-1) 
 
Democratic Attitudes: There are people that always criticize the government.  To what  
point do you approve the right of those people to vote? 
To what point do you approve their right to protest peacefully? 
To what point do you approve their right to run for office? 
To what point do you approve their right to appear on TV to give a  
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speech? 
To what point do you approve a law that would ban public  
protests? 
To what point do you approve the right of association of any organization 
that critiques the government? 
To what point do you approve the government banning TV shows? 
To what point do you approve the government banning books at a  
public school? 
To what point do you approve the government censuring the media  
that criticizes the government? 
 
Corruption Attitudes: In a situation where a deputy accepts a bribe to help a  
corporation, would you say that the deputy is: a) corrupt and should be 
punished b) corrupt but justified c) not corrupt. 
    
An unemployed person is the brother-in-law of an important politician.  
The politician uses his contacts to get him a public job.  This politician is: 
a) corrupt and should be punished b) corrupt but justified c) not corrupt. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Female      Income  (household) 
0 Man       0 No Income 
1 Woman      1 Less than 800 
       2 Between 801-1600 
Catholic      3 $1,601-$2,400 
0 Non Catholic     4 $2,401-$3,200 
1 Catholic      5 $3,201-$4,000 
         6 $4,001-$5,400 
 Education      7 $5,401-$6,800 
In years between 0 and post-graduate   8 $6,801-$10,000 
       9 $10,001-$13,500 
Ideological Spectrum:    10 More than $13,501 
1 to 10 with 10 being Far Right. 
 
Economic Perspective: 
Current Economic Situation of the Country 
How would you rate the Economic situation of the country? 
5. Very good. 4. Good. 3. Not good or bad.  2. Bad. 1. Very bad.  
 
Economic Forecast 
Do you think that in the next twelve months, the economic situation will improve? 
3. Better.  2. The same.  1. Worse. 
 
Unemployment 
Have you been unemployed in the last year? 
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1. Yes. 0. No. 
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APPENDIX B 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES FOR CHAPTER 3 
Operationalization of Variables and Sources 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Participation: percentage of people that voted as divided between actual vote and number of 
people in the lista nominal in the different elections (for presidente municipal—county 
executive—or for state deputy). 
 
Competitiveness: Distance in vote percentage between the two top vote getters. 
 
Third party power: Sum of the two top vote getters subtracted from one hundred. 
 
Incumbent Party: Dummy variable representing whether or not the winner of the municipio’s 
election belonged to the same party that had won previously. 1 for yes, 0 otherwise.  
 
Governor’s Party: Dummy variable representing whether or not the winner of the municipio’s 
election belonged to the party (or coalition) that elected the current governor of the state. 1 for 
yes, 0 otherwise. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Immigration numbers per household: All numbers come from the 2000 dataset carried out by 
CONAPO, which itself was based on the census sample that surveyed 2.2 million households in 
Mexico.  This is available at http://www.conapo.gob.mx 
 
Households: Number of domestic units in each of the 2443 municipios in Mexico. 
 
Households that receive remittances: Percentage of domestic units in the municipio where at 
least one of its members declared having received money transferences from another country. 
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Households with migrants in the US (from the previous five year cycle): Percentage of 
domestic units where at least one person left the municipio between 1995 and 2000 to live 
permanently in the US. 
 
Households with circular migrants (from the previous five year cycle): Percentage of domestic 
units from the municipio where at least one person lived in the US between 1995 and 2000, but 
where both census (1995, 2000) counted the person as having lived in Mexico. 
 
Households with return migrants (from the previous five year cycle): Percentage of domestic 
units where at least one person lived in the US for more than five years and now is living 
permanently in the municipio. 
 
Percentage of the Female Population: Number for each municipio taken from the INEGI’s 
2000 Census. 
 
Percentage of the Indigenous Population: Number of individuals who self-identified as 
indigenous in the 2000 Census for each municipio. 
 
Percentage of People Employed: Number of individuals who held at least one minimum wage 
job according to the 2000 Census.  
 
Percentage of Catholics: Number of individuals who self-identified as Catholics in the 2000 
Census. 
  
Percentage of Adults: Number for individuals older than 18 in the municipio according to the 
2000 Census. 
 
Size of municipio:  Geographical dimensions in km2 for each municipio.  The source was the 
Enciclopedia de los Municipios de México, published in 1988 with tomes for all 32 states in the 
country.   
 
Percentage of Gap in Educational attainment: Percentage of households with at least one 
member which did not finish middle school. 
 
GDP per capita: GDP per capita counted in current dollars for each municipio, taken from 
CONAPO. 
 
Marginality: Measure created by CONAPO to gauge the marginality of each municipio.  The 
figures are an index that came as a result of a logarithm that included the following data: 
 
Percentage of Illiterate population older than 15. 
Percentage of population older than 15 that did not finish primary school. 
Percentage of population older than 15. 
Percentage of people in households that did not have access to sewer system or bathroom inside 
household. 
Percentage of population in households without access to electricity. 
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Percentage of population in households without access to a water system. 
Percentage of population in households with some level of crowdedness. 
Percentage of population in households with dirt floors. 
Percentage of population in towns with less than 5000 people. 
Percentage of working population living on two minimum salaries or less. 
 
 
Human Index: Measure created by CONAPO to capture the likelihood humans can reach their 
full potential as human beings.  The logarithm here included the following data: 
 
Average life expectancy. 
Likelihood of surviving the first year of life. 
GDP per capita counted in current dollars. 
Average level of education per municipio. 
Quality of education. 
 
 
Social Development Index: Measure created by CONAPO to have a better poverty gauge than 
Marginality or GDP per capita.  The figure is a logarithm that resulted in a coefficient ranging 
theoretically between 0 and 1.  The logarithm includes: 
 
Location of household (urban or rural). 
The material used for the household’s floor.  
Access to drainage and sewer services for the household.  
Level of education is for the main breadwinner.  
Sex of the main breadwinner, 
Age of the main breadwinner,  
Level of crowdedness for the household 
Owning of a stove, 
Owning of a car, 
Owning of a fridge, 
Access to social benefits, 
Number of children under 12 in the household, 
Number of children between 5 and 15 who go to school. 
Number of children between 5 and 15 who work. 
 
Border States: Dummy variable representing whether or not municipio belonged to one of the 
states bordering the United States. 1 for yes, 0 otherwise. 
 
Crime: Number of total reported crimes in a municipio for the year 2000. 
 
 
 
  130
  
APPENDIX C 
FIELD WORK QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR CHAPTER 4 
Field Work Questionnaire 
1. To what extent do you think migrants have had an impact on the area? 
2. To what extent do you think migrants have had a political impact on the area? 
3. Do you think that migrants have different political attitudes than individuals that never left? 
4. Do you think that migrants have different political concerns than individuals that never left? 
5. To what extent do you think experience abroad is valuable in trying to solve political       
    problems? 
6. To what extent are people interested in participating politically in this area?  Would you say  
     that people are very much interested? Somewhat interested? Or not interested at all? 
7. To what extent do you think it matters to people from this area the specific party that gains  
power?  Would you say that it makes a lot of difference? Some difference? Or no difference at       
all?  (This question asked to non-politicians). 
8. To what extent do you think people see voting as a way to change things?  Do you think they  
    find it useful or that it makes no difference at all?  (This question asked to non politicians). 
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